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Abstract
Dynamic programming is used in many military and industrial applications to solve
sequential decision making problems. The concept of nation building can be viewed
as such a problem. This research explores the application of dynamic programming
in this context. In the history of the United States there have been several instances
of nation building operations, only 4 of 15 had success when it comes to developing
a self sustaining democracy [73]. The frequency of such operations is on the rise;
however, they are difficult to model because of a lack of measurable metrics. This
research develops a model and approach to address this gap. Through the creation of
component indices to capture the state of operational variables: Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII), a functional form of a
system of differential equations is developed to account for the interactions between
the state indices and instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Mil-
itary, and Economic (DIME). The special structure of the problem is then exploited
through the application of dynamic programming to determine an improved alloca-
tion of resources that accounts for resource constraints. Solving this problem with
dynamic programming provides an improved sequence which describes the applica-
tion of DIME in a manner that minimizes an objective (i.e. cost,time). In addition,
the application of dynamic programming allows the model to account for external
factors such as an insurgent reaction to US policy. An application of the model is
derived for Iraq to demonstrate the utility of the model and explore various aspects
of the solution space. This modeling approach offers a potential significant capability
when analyzing and planning for nation building operations.
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NATION BUILDING MODELING
AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
VIA DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
I. Introduction
Historically, nation-building attempts by outside powers are notable
mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs [73]
Pei and Kasper
1.1 Motivation
In the history of the United States (US) there have been over 200 instances where
the armed forces have been used abroad; since 1900, 18 of those instances have been
nation building operations [73]. Most recently the operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq are clear examples of the full spectrum of operations, where major combat oper-
ations became nation building operations. Considering these 19 instances, Iraq and
Afghanistan not included, only four (Japan, West Germany, Grenada, and Panama)
were still a democracy 10 years after the operations concluded. The recent track
record for this metric of long term success is less than desirable.
The two recent instances of these type of operations have taken place in Afghanistan
(2001-ongoing) and Iraq (2003-2011). In terms of the military support that has been
provided, it has come in the form of major combat operations and nation building
operations. The frequency, duration, and complexity of these operations describe a
perceived threat to not only US national security but security in all regions of the
world, most recently demonstrated by France and its effort in Mali (2013-ongoing).
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The modern concept of nation building can be defined as “the use of an armed
force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the
objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with it-
self and its neighbors” [38]. When evaluating major combat operations (MCO), the
measurements are more clearly defined and easier to measure. The kinetic nature of
the operations have distinguishable outcomes (i.e. number of forces killed, number of
objectives secured) which are typical incorporated in today’s combat models. From
analysis of nation–building operations it is clear to see that the metrics to evalu-
ate these operations are not well defined. However, the frequency of operations is
increasing and the costs are becoming more severe.
Most current research is focused on the first three phases of Joint operations
(Deter, Seize the Initiative, and Dominate) even though history has shown that the
Phase IV (Stabilize) operations can be the longest and most critical when setting
the conditions for long term peace and stability. Therefore, it is crucial to allocate
resources for these type of operations which produce the best result with the least
cost; an optimal solution.
1.2 Research Contribution
This dissertation demonstrates how a political and social science concept such as
nation building can be modeled as a system of differential equations and analyzed us-
ing dynamic programming. This is a multi-step approach; developing a set of indices
to define the state, using a system of differential equations to define the transfer func-
tion, and finally developing improved policies using dynamic programming. Thus, the
objective is to determine how US resources can be allocated in a nation building oper-
ation to set the conditions for long term success while minimizing the costs associated
with expending those resources. This is accomplished through five contributions:
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1. Develop a methodology which creates indices to capture the “state” of a nation.
This method is novel and innovative in that it makes use of open source data
and is adaptable to the set of available data. This will be accomplished using
the DIME–PMESII (defined in Chapter II) paradigm.
2. Development of a model that accounts for the evolution of the state of a country
and what influence PMESII states have on one another; as well as the impact
of external influences, namely DIME inputs.
3. Development of a near–optimal policy using approximate dynamic program-
ming, based upon the resources which the US can provide in nation building
operations.
4. Development of a model that accounts for the evolution of the state of a country
and what influence PMESII states have on one another; as well as accounting
for the impact of external influences, namely DIME inputs and enemy influences
as measured by stochastic shocks or events.
5. Development of a near–optimal policy using approximate dynamic programming
by implementing shocks based on the number and severity of attacks and laying
the framework for consideration of the probabilistic behavior of enemy shocks
or events.
This is demonstrated through examples using data from operations in Iraq.
1.3 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter II
contains a detailed literature review, Chapter III describes the system of differential
equations model, Chapter IV describes the dynamic programming solution, Chapter
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V describes the dynamic programming solution with enemy events, and Chapter VI
describes future research efforts.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter examines the literature which applies to the creation of the model
and solution methodology. Each area focuses on a concept and how that concept was
applied in this methodology. The literature review provides the reader with a succinct
but thorough overview of areas of study that are directly related to addressing the
research question. In following chapters, literature that directly relates to a specific
chapter is presented as well.
2.1 DIME–PMESII Paradigm
The instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Eco-
nomic), sometimes referred to as the elements of national power, or categorized under
the acronym DIME , are tools at the disposal of the US to aid in achieving its na-
tional strategic objectives. All four instruments may be applied or a subset of the four;
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive events. Operational planning is described
in terms of six interrelated operational variables (Political, Military, Economic, So-
cial, Information, and Infrastructure or PMESII). The PMESII variables describe
the military aspects of the operational environment as well as the influence of the
population on the operational environment. As a result, they provide a view which
emphasizes the human aspects of the operational environment. A thorough under-
standing of PMESII helps to appreciate how the military instrument complements the
other instruments of national power [36:1-5]. The DIME-PMESII paradigm considers
the the relationship between the two concepts. A description of each instrument and
operational variable follows.
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2.1.1 Diplomacy (DIME).
The diplomatic instrument is the primary means employed by the Department of
State (DOS) to engage other states to advance the values, interests, and objectives
of the US [34:I-9].
Diplomacy takes on many different actions, including, but not limited to: provid-
ing mentors to a fledgling government, providing an interim structure to aid during
a transition period, providing and conducting elections, and providing support to
legitimize a government in the eyes of other states.
Assessing and determining the level of diplomatic assistance is a complicated task
that may be controversial. The amount of support is based on elections and diplomatic
support levels, a government run by an external government is a value of 1, shared
support with the host nation is a value of 0.5, and completely autonomous elections
run by the host nation is a value of 0 for the purposes of this research.
2.1.2 Informational (DIME).
The informational instrument deals with both the protection of information and
the distribution of information. According to JP 1-0, the uses of the informational
instrument are
...processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to cre-
ate, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national in-
terests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes,
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments
of national power. [34:I-9]
The informational instrument is perhaps one of the most complex instruments to
manage because it is so difficult to measure. The ability to determine the impact or
calculate the reception of a message in a contested area is often unknown. For this
reason the informational instrument is not included in this research effort.
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2.1.3 Military (DIME).
The military instrument is perhaps the most well–known, often used aspect of
DIME. The US military can take on a wide range of operations in order to support
the US national strategic objectives. In this instance the focus is on nation building
and related operations. In these operations the application of the military instrument
continues well after the completion of a conflict, humanitarian operation, or other
type of operation. The wide range of operations the military can conduct makes
it a valuable commodity in the application of DIME. In this research, the military
instrument is defined as the number of troops (per hundred thousand per month) on
the ground in support of a US mission.
2.1.4 Economic (DIME).
The typical employment of the economic instrument in nation building is through
aid packages and assistance to the nations economy. This is to aid in making a
self–supportive nation, when aid can be curtailed. In this research the economic
instrument is defined as the amount of economic support in dollars (per billion per
month) provided to the nation.
2.1.5 Political (PMESII).
The political variable is a description of the distribution of responsibility and
power across all levels of government. There may be conflicting political groups and
each may interact with the US or multinational force differently. Understanding the
unique circumstances that motivate and drive these groups requires an understanding
of all the relevant partnerships and their interactions– political, economic, military,
religious, and cultural [36:1-5,6].
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2.1.6 Military (PMESII).
The military variable describes the military capability of all armed forces in a
specific operational environment. The armed forces of a state may include the role
of providing both internal and external security. Additionally, influencing the mili-
tary variable are paramilitary and guerilla forces. The organization’s ability to field
capabilities and use them locally, regionally, or globally is one way of assessing the mil-
itary variable. These capabilities include: 1) Equipment, 2) Manpower, 3) Doctrine,
4) Training levels, and 5) Resource constraints [36:1-6].
2.1.7 Economic (PMESII).
The economic variable deals with the behaviors of individuals and groups pertain-
ing to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. The influence of
industry, trade, development, finance, policies, capabilities, and legal constraints will
play a significant part in the behaviors associated with economics. Factors associated
with changes in the economic environment may include investments, price fluctuation,
debt, and the existence of black markets [36:1-6,7].
2.1.8 Social (PMESII).
The society within a operational environment is the social variable. A society is
“a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a
common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity” [36:1-7]. As
with many factors the attributes of a society may change over time, leading to a split
within a society. The societies actions, opinions, or influences should be considered
within the social environment, as they can have an effect on the mission [36:1-7].
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2.1.9 Information (PMESII).
The information variable describes the information environment, which is the net-
work of people, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act
on information. Not all states have a complex telecommunications network to share
information, but nonetheless the information will be shared through less sophisti-
cated methods [36:1-8]. Due to the complex nature in measuring the effectiveness of
information, it was not be considered in this research.
2.1.10 Infrastructure (PMESII).
The infrastructure variable describes the basic facilities, services, and installations
required for a society to function. This also includes technological advances and
development which can be applied to both civil and military purposes [36:1-8].
2.1.11 DIME-PMESII Summary.
While each operational environment is different and constantly evolving over time,
the PMESII variables are used to help understand this complex adaptive environ-
ment, while the DIME inputs are used to understand the actions conducted. This
DIME-PMESII term is typically used to describe operations [53]; specifically nation–
building operations. For this reason the system of differential equations is modeled
using this DIME-PMESII paradigm. The exclusion of the informational instrument
and operational variable leaves a slightly abridged version of the paradigm, which is
described as DME–PMESI or PMESI-DME from here forward.
2.2 Inverse Problems
The goal in solving several types of problems is to determine the set of param-
eters which describe the system and the laws and principles relating the values of
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the parameters to the results of measurements. When some information is known
about the values of the measurements, a theoretical relationship can be used to infer
information on the values of the parameters. When the problem is posed in this
manner, it is called an inverse problem. In inverse problems, the data are results of
the measurements and the unknowns are the values of the parameters [92]. Partial
information is given or known about a state function, x(t) and the goal is to infer
something about the laws governing state evolution, values of constant parameters,
values of exogenous functions which characterize the system, or values of boundary
conditions at certain points in time [45].
Tarantola and Valette propose that all problems, inverse or not, to be stated as
well-posed problems are formulated as follows:
1. We have a certain state of information available on the values of the data set [92].
2. We also have a certain state of information on the values of the unknowns [92].
3. We have a certain state of information concerning the theoretical relationship
that exists between the data and the unknowns [92].
4. Which is the final state of information on the values of the unknowns resulting
from the combination of the three preceding states [92]?
Many experiments contain a finite amount of data in which one can reconstruct
a model with infinitely many degrees of freedom. The result is an inverse problem
is not unique in that there are many models that can explain the data. According
to Tarantola and Valette, inversion really consists of two steps, from the traditional
inverse problem there is the true model (m) and data (d). From the data, d an
estimated model (mˆ) is constructed, this is an estimation problem. Additionally,
the relationship between the estimated model, mˆ and the true model, m must be
investigated. This is called the appraisal problem [89]. The notion of this division
of problems is illustrated in Figure 1. The estimation problem is typically solved by
fitting the model to the data, by letting the ith data element di be related to the
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Figure 1. A problem divided into a forward problem, estimation problem, and appraisal
problem for finite data sets, adapted from [89:389]
model m through the following relation
di = Gi(m) (2.1)
where Gi(m) is a nonlinear function and Gi(m) 7→ di. The data fitting can be
accomplished by minimizing the difference between the real data, di and estimated
data Gi(mˆ) through a least-squares fit
S(mˆ) =
∑
i
(di −Gi(mˆ))2 (2.2)
as a function of the estimated model mˆ[89].
The use of inverse problems in this research is to infer information about the
dynamics of the system through a priori knowledge of the exogenous system variables,
much like Lanchester equations in Section 2.3.
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2.3 Lanchester Equations
Within military applications, one of the most famous treatments of inverse prob-
lems are the Lanchester equation solutions, published in F. W. Lanchester’s Aircraft
in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm in 1916. While much of the focus of
Lanchester’s book centers on aircraft and their emerging use in World War I, his ma-
jor contribution was to offer a set of differential equations to model combat power for
both enemy (x) and ally (y) strength, by using existing data. Beginning with aerial
combat he developed the Linear Law (unaimed fire)
dx
dt
= −Axy (2.3)
dy
dt
= −Byx
where attrition is proportional to the attrition coefficients (A,B) and the size of both
forces (x, y). This is associated with area fire such as indirect fire. To deal with direct
or aimed fire, he developed the Square Law (aimed fire)
dx
dt
= −Ay (2.4)
dy
dt
= −Bx
where attrition is proportional to the strength (x, y) and effectiveness (A,B) [55].
Later Lanchester broadened his equations to apply in other types of conflicts. As
an inverse problem, the coefficients are determined through knowledge of the data at
time t. Lanchester’s work continues to serve as the basis and motivation for much
research, to include this research.
Over time, several researchers have used Lanchester equations on prominent bat-
tles as the data became available. In addition to using new data, they also applied
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the equations to different types of conflicts, evaluated several of the parameters, and
utilized multiple methods to solve the parameters. Bracken generalized Lanchester
equations to model the Ardennes campaign in World War II, where he considered the
performance of either opposing force at a point in time, with tactical parameters and
attrition rates. Bracken solved for these parameters by implementing a brute–force
method through a constrained grid search [22]. Extending Bracken’s work, Fricker
examined the same Ardennes campaign, but used a linear regression technique [41].
Clemens analyzed the same data set utilizing a nonlinear fit with the Newton-Rhapson
algorithm [30]. Helmbold makes use of the Newton-Rhapson algorithm while exam-
ining the square law with scheduled reinforcements, as a direct problem and as an
inverse problem [45]. Lucas and Turkes applied a response surface methodology to
the Ardennes data set and solved for the parameters by regression through the origin.
This method allowed them to use a contour plot and visually assess the optimal point
for the parameters. Lucas and Turkes also advanced the idea of using R2 when using
linear regression to compare models using weighted data [56]. Previous methods had
primarily focused on the sum of squared residuals or sum of squared errors (SSE).
The conjugate gradient method is used by Chen to determine the coefficients for
time dependent attrition in the nonlinear Lanchester square law inverse problem
dx1(t)
dt
=−D(t;x1, x2)x2(t) + dR1(t)
dt
, t > 0;x1(0) = x1,0 (2.5)
dx2(t)
dt
=− A(t;x1, x2)x1(t) + dR2(t)
dt
, t > 0;x2(0) = x2,0 (2.6)
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where
A,D are force dependent attrition coefficients
R1, R2 are the total reinforcement
x1, x2 are the estimated force strengths
by making use of the observed force strength data. In order to numerically solve these
equations the fourth–order Runge–Kutta method was used. Chen found this method
to be advantageous because there was no prior knowledge required to solve for the
unknown parameters. This method allows for an arbitrary initial starting point [29].
The application of Lanchester Equations has been documented in other areas as
well, such as irregular warfare. Schaffer, for example, used Lanchester Equations to
model guerilla warfare and asymmetric engagements while employing and operational-
izing an array of variables and coefficients (representing weapons strength, discipline,
morale, etc.) to model an insurgent force in Phase II of an insurgency [84]. Richard-
son used a system of differential equations to model the arms race and instability
of nation states based upon the current levels of its neighboring and/or menacing
states [78].
The use of discrete dynamical systems (DDS) by Fox [40] continues the work of
Lanchester equations and proposes a model for insurgency and counter-insurgency
warfare using the paradigm, Future = Present + Change. Fox’s use of DDS is based
upon the mathematical properties they provide. His paradigm is similar to an Euler
step where the system transitions to future states based upon its current state and
the current rate of change.
In 2010 Lukens [57] describes the DOD desire to expand irregular warfare (IW)
modeling to inform program decisions and proposes a model to replicate the dynamics
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of IW. This model extends basic Lanchester equations to account for four factors
(friendly forces, enemy forces(terrorists and insurgents), host nation forces, and the
population. Lukens describes modeling the elements of Power (DIME) in IW, noting
that the modeling these elements is extremely complex and not recommended in a
basic warfare dynamics model. Lukens provides a rough framework to look at DIME
but does not include it in his model.
In 2011 Atkinson, Gutfraind, and Kress [5] incorporates the concept of foreign
intervention in Lanchester models, specifically in the setting of an armed revolt. This
adds the aspect of an external force in to the equation, whereas models such as
Lukens [57], Fox [40], and others only consider internal forces. This external force
is representative of nation building operations and demonstrated in recent revolts
(Libya, Syrian, and Afghanistan).
2.4 Mean–Field Theory
Many problems involve a large number of independent variables where the exact
calculation of such a problem is infeasible. In order to solve these problems, efficient
approximation techniques are needed in order to better understand their dynamics.
The method of using a Mean–Field Equation (MFE) to approximate these dynamics
is an efficient approximation method to aid in solving problems dealing with uncer-
tainty and complexity [72:ix,1].
In this method, the values of the variables to be examined are replaced with the
MFE. The variables of the dynamical system are used to determine some mean value;
this is accomplished through an equation that provides the mean–field simplification.
This allows the focus to be placed on one variable at a time by effectively holding
the others constant. To consider this intuitively, envision a problem with multiple
variables and only one is not represented by its mean value. This leaves the one free
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variable independent of the others, thus creating the ability to calculate the value
of the free variable. The process is then repeated in the same fashion over all of
the remaining values. Persson, Claesson, and Nordebo use this technique to conduct
discrete adaptive filtering using a mean–field algorithm to minimize the Wienr-Hopf
equations in a least–squares sense to produce comparable results without transient
behavior and to facilitate abrupt system changes [74].
The mean–field equations can be the mean value or an approximated probability
distribution to represent the unknown variables. With a large number of variables
that exhibit nonlinear behaviors fitting them with a nonlinear least–squares model
is an effective method [74]. This concept was shown using an epidemic model based
upon a system of differential equations by Kleczkowski and Grenfell [51].
This method injects a portion of generality into the process which still accounts
for the noise in the system, yet simplifies the problem by using a constant in the
place of a changing variable. This method replaces some of the stochastic elements
with deterministic elements, resulting in a stochastic system represented through its
deterministic equivalent.
This method is not without error, as the number of estimated variables reduces
the overall confidence level of the result by one degree of freedom with each estimated
variable. This does not indicate inaccuracy, but rather that the end result will be
an overall estimation of the system based upon the previous interactions. It may
downplay the effect of outliers in the generalization, but it does account for them.
The error in the system is expected to be normally distributed. This is important to
the least–squares fitting aspect and the independence of the variables in the system.
This method replaces an infinite dimension system with several dependent variables,
with a series of independent variables in a finite dimension system, thus reducing the
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overall complexity of the problem and allowing us to understand the dynamics of
complex problems.
2.5 Dynamical Systems
When creating models, a real world system to study is identified, all the aspects of
that system are studied, and assumptions are made when and where they are needed.
After studying the system, it is often translated into a mathematical relationship
which can be modeled. A knowledge of mathematics is used to conduct analysis on
this system in order to solve the complicated interrelationships that exist in the real
world system. This solution then translates the knowledge gained from the model
back to the real world system. Dynamical modeling is the science of modeling real
world phenomena as it changes over time [82:3].
According to Boccara and Meiss, the definition of a dynamical system is a set
or system of equations whose solution describes the evolution or trajectory of the
state, as a function of a parameter (time), along a set of states (phase space) of
the system [82:105-106] [19:11]. The theory behind dynamical systems is primarily
concerned with the qualitative properties of the system dynamics and gaining an
understanding of the asymptotic properties, as t → ∞. A typical dynamical system
is comprised of a phase space, S, whose elements represent all possible states for the
system; a time parameter, t, which may be discrete or continuous; and an evolution
rule (a rule that governs the transition of states from ti to ti+1 based upon knowledge of
the states at prior times) [19:105-106]. A dynamical system is characterized according
to these three elements. Systems with both discrete time space and time variables are
often considered mappings. When the evolution rule is deterministic then for each
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time, t, it is a mapping from phase space to phase space
ϕt : S → S (2.7)
so that x(t) = ϕt(x0) indicates the state of the system at time t that begins at x0.
The value of t is assumed to only take on values in some allowed range, the set of
nonnegative real numbers R+ and the initial value of t = 0⇒ ϕ0(x0) = x0 [82:106].
Dynamical systems can be modeled by a finite number of coupled first-order or-
dinary differential equations
x˙1 = f1(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up)
x˙2 = f2(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up)
...
x˙n = fn(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up), (2.8)
where x˙i is the derivative of xi with respect to time, t, and the set of variables
u1, u2, . . . , up are control variables required for that system. The variables x1, x2, . . . , xn
are the state variables and represent the memory the dynamical system has of its past.
In order to write these systems in compact form, vector notation is generally used.
First, the vectors are defined as
x =

x1
x2
...
xn

, u =

u1
u2
...
up

, f(t, x, u) =

f1(t, x, u)
f2(t, x, u)
...
fn(t, x, u)

, (2.9)
18
and then rewritten as a compact first-order vector differential equation
x˙ = f(t, x, u). (2.10)
This is the state equation where x is the state and u is the control. Another equation
y = h(t, x, u), (2.11)
may define an output vector comprised of variables of particular interest in the anal-
ysis of the system. The two together form the state space model or state model.
Mathematical models of finite dimensional systems are not always developed in the
form of a state model. However, physical systems can thoroughly be modeled in this
form by carefully selecting the state variables [50:1-4].
While nonlinear systems are often more accurate models of real world systems
than linear models, many of the linear models are actually linearizations of nonlinear
models because it is often difficult to find a closed form solution of a nonlinear system.
By using the appropriate techniques it is possible to determine qualitative behaviors
of the solutions of a nonlinear system which is desired [82:367].
2.6 Reconstruction Operations
One attempt to model the dynamics involved in reconstruction operations was
using systems dynamics modeling techniques to simulate the establishment of public
order and safety by Richardson. The purpose was to help decision makers by providing
insight regarding the possible policy alternatives presented to them. The main idea
is to take complex problems and break them down into manageable subproblems,
then aggregate assumptions about the simpler questions to estimate answers for the
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larger complex problem. This was demonstrated in a notional example at a national
level [77].
Robbins then advanced the model by instituting a sub-national, regional level ap-
proach. This allowed the user to concentrate on potentially troublesome regions, by
providing information specific to the dynamics within that AOR. The results help
the user understand the significance of the dynamic relationship of forces involved
during nation–building and potentially gain insight to the successful completion of
the nation–building mission [79]. This model eventually was re-engineered by Air
Force Research Laboratory–Rome Laboratory (AFRL-RL) to become the National
Operational Environment Model (NOEM) currently maintained by the same orga-
nization.
The application of goal programming was conducted by Bang to formulate the
Coalition Operation Planning Model which was based upon three different sub-
models: the Coalition Mission-Unit Allocation Model (Shortest Path), the Coalition
Mission-Support Model (Network Flow), and the Coalition Mission-Unit Grouping
Model (Quadratic Assignment). This method was applied to notional humanitarian
assistance scenario and showed that many of the decisions were directly influenced
by the political nature of the coalition and the framework provided by the political
situation [7].
Tauer, Nagi, and Sudit [93] formulated a simplified version of the model by
Richardson [77] as a markov decision process. Tauer et al used a Reduced Approxi-
mate Linear Program for the H-neighborhood around an initial state x0, assuming a
given expert’s policy piE (RALPH
H
E ). This was used to model the transition between
population classes (Unemployed, Private, Government).
A goal programming project scheduling approach was conducted by Chaney to
prioritize and schedule activities to maximize the impacts in nation–building. This
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was established through three goals: 1) restore essential services in a timely man-
ner, 2) distribute employment equally throughout the state, and 3) meet standards
for sustainable income in each region. This was applied in a notional scenario, and
showed how to schedule activities to meet the three goals while still meeting the intent
of the initial response. Chaney presented three main points in this work: 1) consider
economic impacts of reconstruction activities, 2) quantitative project scheduling tech-
niques can be applied to nation–building, and 3) the establish of these techniques adds
defensibility to the plan and can uncover potential shortfalls [27].
2.7 Network Models
A social network analysis study was conducted by Bernardoni using Ronald Burt’s
structural hole technique to facilitate nation–building in failing and failed states.
Bernardoni applied Burt’s technique at a national level to identify the structural gaps
within a failing state by focusing on techniques that link professional and government
community individuals [9].
Arney and Arney [4] use a large scale system of differential equations and net-
works to model counter-insurgency and coalition operations in stages. The network
model describes the collaboration link between nodes while the system of differential
equations provides the metrics to evaluate operations. While the aspect of external
forces is applied, the metrics are largely based on populations of groups within the
model.
2.8 Classification Models
With the number of failing or failed states on the rise, the ability to determine
the indicators which lead to a failed state and identify states which are failing is a
desirable feature. Nysether used factor analysis to identify the indicators and then
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apply discriminant analysis using the identified factors to classify states as stable,
borderline, or failing. This was applied using opensource data for 200 countries with
167 variables. This research is useful in identifying states which may require future
nation–building [68].
Understanding the factors which lead to war termination was researched by Robin-
son through the use of binary and multinomial logistic regression techniques. Robin-
son found that duration of conflict was the most relevant factor in predicting the
winner of conflict and total casualties was the most relevant factor in predicting the
manner in which an interstate war ends. This was examined in analysis of 19th and
20th century data [80].
Using the same methods as Nysether and Robinson as well as Canonical Corre-
lation and Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Tannehill develop a mathematical
model to forecast instability indicators in the Horn of Africa region using 54 vari-
ables over 32 years of observations. This model used indicators such as battle deaths,
refugees, genocide deaths, and undernourishment to forecast instability. Tannehill
found that a four–year forecast was possible while maintaining or improving the fore-
cast error rate. This demonstrated the feasibility of longer term predictive models
which would allow policy makers more time to develop plans [91].
In 2007, the Center for Army Analysis CAA initiated the Forecast and Anal-
ysis of Complex Threats (FACT) study. This study looked at predicting the po-
tential for future conflict in select nation–states. The study found 13 features to
measure and scaled the features on a [0, 1] scale using the Euclidian distance between
a nation–states forecasted future and all other nation–states pasts, both points in
the 13 dimensional feature space. A PCA was conducted in an attempt to reduce
the dimensionality of the data. The components then provided a proxy for similarity
between states. A forecast was then generated using a Weighted Moving Average
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(a) Coalition and Regional (b) Indigenous
Figure 2. RAND Study Models[59:98,115]
(WMA) and used both the k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Nearest Centroid (NC)
algorithms to classify future features. The study found that KNN performed bet-
ter than NC with 85% or greater accuracy in all test cases. The methodology was
adopted for use under the premise that it is predictive rather then prescriptive as
described by Shearer [87].
The RAND Arroyo Center conducted a study looking at the strategic elements
to build partner capacity for stability operations in nations around the globe. The
study focused on the elements which would align the security cooperation efforts of
the US and building partner capacity. As part of this study they created two models;
the Coalition and Regional model and the Indigenous model, shown in Figure 2.
The Coalition and Regional model was used to assess the capability of nations to
be partners in stability operations: 28 countries fell into the high capability category,
5 of which were considered preferred. The study concluded that some high capability
countries are either unwilling to participate and/or are inappropriate for such oper-
ations. The preferred countries were Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and South Africa [59:111].
The Indigenous model assessed how fragile a state was and the threat posed if
they deteriorated or collapsed. The study found that this model also listed 28 of the
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31 countries listed in the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index. Out of the 28, 16
were candidates based upon the US having two or more strategic interests with that
country. The 16 are Afghanistan, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
and Venezuela. Several of these nations are receiving aid already or are considered
ineligible because of the current government in place [59:122-123].
The study concluded that it would be beneficial for the US to develop a selective
strategy for partnership that nests with the security of the nation and the national
military strategy [59:123-124].
In 2009 Abdollahian, Nicholson, Nickens, and Baranick [1] provided the Formal
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Model (FSROM) using a system of dif-
ferential equations and seeming unrelated regression estimation (SURE) determine
the optimal degree of foreign aid, multilateralism (number of nations participating),
and operation length. The model was tested using instances of nation building opera-
tions from post World War II through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with mixed
but promising results. The premise of the model is simple gains and losses, where
comparisons are made to pre-conflict levels. Several of the equations are related to
the size of the guerilla force, which indicates an underlying population model. The
authors elude to the ratio of troops to guerrillas as a contributing factor to the suc-
cess/failure in some of the case studies, yet overall conclude there is no “magic ratio”.
Two observations are pointed out in the work. First, the resolution of the data, both
spatial and time is not adequate,. Secondly, that more detailed (stabilization and
reconstruction) factors were necessary to identify the important aspects of policies
and developing courses of action.
The FSROM model attempts to capture three aspects of stabilization and recon-
struction operations. None of the three are controllable by the US. The US certainly
24
has an impact on the foreign aid, size of the coalition, and the length of the operation
but all of these aspects are outside the purview of the US. While providing analysis
through these variables may provide insight to the problem, this model is still lacking
the prescriptive nature described by Shearer [87]. Any adjustments in policy based
on analysis from this model requires a multilateral effort.
In 2014 King [46] looked at classifying, predicting success, and estimating forces
required to conduct counter insurgency operations. While this research makes uses of
multiple aspects of DIME, the key output is the number of external forces to maximize
the probability of success in counter insurgency.
2.9 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Models
In 2008 Blank et al, developed a dynamic model of insurgency using Lanchester
equations and Iraq war data. The model proposes a system of differential equations
dI
dt
=(ri − γc)C
dC
dt
=(rc − γi)I, (2.12)
where
I is the number of insurgent attacks on the coalition
C is size of the coalition
ri is the recruitment rate of the insurgents
rc is the recruitment rate of the coalition
γi is the combat effectiveness coefficient of the insurgents
γc is the combat effectiveness coefficient of the coalition.
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The general solution to the system of differential equations is then used to plot the
phase portraits of the system and deduce information based upon four cases: 1) the
coalition increases in size and the number of attacks by the insurgents increases, 2) the
size of the coalition decreases and the number of attacks by insurgents decreases,
3) the coalition increases and the number of insurgent attacks decreases, and 4) the
coalition decreases and the number of insurgent attacks increases [18].
The relevance of the case is dependent upon the net recruitment rates (ri − γc)
and (rc − γi) of the coalition and insurgents as well as the combat effectiveness of
both sides. Using these plots the case where there is no coalition presence and the
insurgent attacks are zero, the system is unstable, implying there is no amenable
solution that leads to stability [18].
A nation–building model investigating the assimilation of different ethnicities into
a single nation was developed by Yamamoto. This model was derived from the system
of differential equations in the Deutsch Model for Nation–Formation by Karl Deutsch.
Yamamoto derived two models and applied them to the Philippines [102].
The Modernism model is predicated upon the belief that a single underlying pop-
ulation (U) will mobilize into two different groups, assimilated (N) and differentiated
(H). The Modernism model is formulated as
dN
dt
= gN + αmU
dH
dt
= gH + (1− α)mU
dU
dt
= gU −mU, (2.13)
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where
g is the natural population increase rate
m is the mobilization rate
α is the rate of integrating into the assimilated group (N)
α,m ∈ (0, 1].
The Historicism model is predicated upon the belief that underlying population
(U) is composed of two groups (Q,R) which will mobilize into the assimilated (Q 7→
N) and differentiated (R 7→ H). The Historicism model is formulated as
dN
dt
= gN + αmQ
dH
dt
= gH + (1− α)mR
dQ
dt
= gQ− αmQ
dR
dt
= gR− (1− α)mR. (2.14)
where
g is the natural population increase rate
m is the mobilization rate
α is the rate of integrating into the assimilated group (N)
α,m ∈ (0, 1].
These models investigate the effectiveness of the integration policies implemented
by the Philippine government. The results suggest that the integration policy which
involves the creation of an environment where multiple cultural groups can coexist
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is the most successful. Assimilating two groups into one culture in the Modernism
model was unsuccessful [102].
A population model developed by Johnson and Madin was based upon the Logistic
differential equation. This model makes use of population size (N), recruitment (r),
carrying capacity (K), and mortality (m) to investigate the dynamics in the insurgent
population. The discrete time logistic model takes on the following form
∆N = r
(
1− N
K
)
N
Nt+1 = Nt+ r
(
1− Nt
K
)
Nt −mt. (2.15)
The model is applied to counterinsurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Iraq (2003-
2006) making use of data from United Kingdom Royal Air Force records and the
Brookings Institution respectively. Given the available data, a least–squares opti-
mization was implemented to estimate the unknown parameters (K, r), which are
assumed to remain constant through the time period. After fitting the parameters,
future trajectories were calculated using Equation 2.15. The results in the Iraq model
suggested that 1) if sectarian violence had remained at low levels (such as 2006), the
insurgency would have collapsed in 4-5 years based upon the US maintaining the
trend of improving military performance, 2) moderate changes to the combination of
K, r, or m may have led to the defeat of the insurgency in 6-12 months. Johnson
and Madin suggest that increase in sectarian violence was the reason that the second
case did not take place [47].
2.10 Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming (DP) is a mathematical tool to analyze sequential decision
making. Whether the problem is deterministic or stochastic, discrete or continuous
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time, or have a finite or infinite time horizon the underlying principle problem at hand
is how to sequence decisions which minimize (or maximize) some objective function.
While DP takes on a wide range of problem formulations the one considered in this
research is the Deterministic Continuous–Time formulation. Pertinent theory will be
reviewed in this document, more complete descriptions can be found in Bellman [8],
Bertsekas [11], and Denardo [33].
2.10.1 Deterministic Continuous–Time Dynamic Programming.
A continuous–time dynamic system can be described as
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.16)
x(0) : given,
where
x(t) ∈ <n is the state vector at time t
x˙(t) ∈ <n is the vector of first order derivatives at time t
u(t) ∈ <m is the control vector at time t
U is the set of admissible controls
T is the terminal time.
The components of f, x, x˙, and u are denoted as fi, xi, x˙i, and ui and the system (2.16)
then represents the following first order differential equations
dxi(t)
dt
= fi (x(t), u(t)) , i = 1, . . . , n. (2.17)
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The vectors– x˙(t), x(t), and u(t) are column vectors and the system, fi is assumed
to be continuously differentiable with respect to x and u. The control functions
(or control trajectories) are piecewise continuous functions {u(t) | t ∈ [0, T ]} with
u(t) ∈ U ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Additionally, it is assumed that for any admissible control
{u(t) | t ∈ [0, T ]}, the system of differential equations (2.16) has a unique solution,
{xu(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]}, which is the corresponding state trajectory.
The goal of this problem is to find the control trajectory {u(t) | t ∈ [0, T ]}, when
coupled with the state trajectory {xu(t) | t ∈ [0, T ]}, minimizes the cost function
h(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
g(x(t), u(t))dt (2.18)
where h is the terminal cost, h and g are continuously differentiable with resect to x,
and g is continuous with respect to u.
The Hamilton–Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation is a partial differential equation,
which under certain assumptions, is satisfied by the optimal cost–to–go function. The
HJB Equation is the continuous–time analog to the DP Algorithm. The application
of DP to a discrete–time approximation of a continuous–time optimal control problem
is demonstrated.
First, divide the time horizon, [0, T ] into N pieces by
δ =
T
N
,
denote
xk = x(kδ), k = 0, 1, . . . , N
uk = u(kδ), k = 0, 1, . . . , N,
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approximate the continuous–time system by
xk+1 = xk + f(xk, uk) · δ
and the cost function by
h(xN) +
N−1∑
k=0
g(xk, uk) · δ
Now apply DP to the discrete–time approximation. Let
J∗(t, x) : Optimal cost–to–go at time t and state x for the continuous–time problem
J˜∗(t, x) : Optimal cost–to–go at time t and state x for the discrete–time problem
The DP equations are:
J˜∗(Nδ, x) = h(x),
J˜∗(kδ, x) = min
u∈U
[
g(x, u) · δ + J˜∗((k + 1) · δ, x+ f(x, u) · δ)
]
, k = 0, . . . , N − 1
where h(x) is the terminal cost. Assuming that J˜∗ is differentiable, it can be expanded
to a first order Taylor series as such:
First define
F (t) = J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt)
and
F ′(t) =
[
∂
∂kδ
+
∂
∂x
]
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt)
=
∂
∂kδ
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt)∂kδ
∂t
+
∂
∂x
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt)∂x
∂t
=
∂
∂kδ
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt) · δ + ∂
∂x
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u)) · δf(x, u).
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Then
F (1) = F (0) +
F ′(0)
1!
+ · · ·+ F
(n)(0)
n!
+
F (n+1)(θ)
(n+ 1)!
Since the expansion is evaluated at the point (kδ, x) this gives
F (0) = J˜∗(kδ, x)
Next, F ′(0) is calculated:
F ′(0) =
[
δ
∂
∂kδ
+ δf(x, u)
∂
∂x
]
J˜∗(kδ + δt, x+ f(x, u) · δt)
∣∣∣
t=0
=
[
δ
∂
∂kδ
+ δf(x, u)
∂
∂x
]
J˜∗(kδ, x)
This yields
F ′(0) = ∇δkJ˜∗(δk, x) · δ +∇xJ˜∗(δk, x)′f(x, u) · δ
The term ∇xJ˜∗(δk, x) is transposed because both ∇xJ˜∗(δk, x) and f(x, u) are vectors
in R2 and this maps R2 → R. Recall that
F (1) = F (0) +
F ′(0)
1!
+ · · ·+ F
(n)(0)
n!
+
F (n+1)(θ)
(n+ 1)!
Which provides:
J˜∗((k+1) ·δ, x+f(x, u) ·δ) = J˜∗(δk, x)+∇tJ˜∗(δk, x) ·δ+∇xJ˜∗(δk, x)′f(x, u) ·δ+o(δ)
where o(δ) represents the second order terms satisfying limδ→0 o(δ)/δ = 0. Substitut-
ing this into the DP equation:
J˜∗(kδ, x) = min
u∈U
[
g(x, u) · δ + J˜∗(δk, x) +∇tJ˜∗(δk, x) · δ +∇xJ˜∗(δk, x)′f(x, u) · δ + o(δ)
]
32
Since J˜∗(δk, x) is not a function of u, subtract J˜∗(δk, x) from both sides and rewrite
the above equation as:
0 = min
u∈U
[
g(x, u) · δ +∇tJ˜∗(δk, x) · δ +∇xJ˜∗(δk, x)′f(x, u) · δ + o(δ)
]
Then divide each term by δ and take the limδ→∞ recalling that limδ→0 o(δ)/δ = 0
gives:
0 = min
u∈U
[
g(x, u) +∇tJ˜∗(δk, x) +∇xJ˜∗(δk, x)′f(x, u)
]
assuming that the continuous equation achieves its discrete function as we take the
limit; in other words:
lim
k→∞,δ→0,δk=0
J˜∗(δk, x) = J∗(t, x), ∀ t, x
The result is:
0 = min
u∈U
[g(x, u) +∇tJ∗(t, x) +∇xJ∗(t, x)′f(x, u)] , ∀ t, x (2.19)
with the boundary condition of:
J∗(T, x) = h(x)
This is the partial differential equation known as the Hamiliton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion.
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Sufficiency Theorem [11]. Suppose V (t, x) is a solution to the HJB equation; that
is, V is continuously differentiable in t and x, and is such that
0 = min
u∈U
[g(x, u) +∇tV (t, x) +∇xV (t, x)′f(x, u)], ∀ t, x (2.20)
V (T, x) = h(x) ∀x (2.21)
Suppose also that µ∗(t, x) attains the minimum in 2.20 ∀t and x. Let {x∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]}
be the state trajectory obtained from the given initial condition x(0) when the con-
trol trajectory u∗(t) = µ∗(t, x∗(t)), t ∈ [0, T ] is used [that is, x∗(0) = x(0) and
∀t ∈ [0, T ], x˙∗(t) = f(x∗(t), µ∗(t, x∗(t))); we assume that this differential equa-
tion has a unique solution starting at any pair (t, x) and that the control trajectory
{µ∗(t, x∗(t))|t ∈ [0, T ]} is piecewise continuous as a function of t]. Then V is equal
to the optimal cost–to–go function, i.e.,
V (t, x) = J∗(t, x), ∀ t, x.
Furthermore, the control trajectory {u∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]} is optimal.
Recalling Equation 2.19 the Sufficiency Theorem suggests that for an initial state,
x0, the control trajectory {u∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]}, is optimal with corresponding state tra-
jectory, {x∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]}, then ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
u∗(t) = arg min
u∈U
[g(x∗(t), u) +∇xJ∗(t, x∗(t))′f(x∗(t), u)] (2.22)
This is basically the minimum principle.
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Minimum Principle [11]. Let {u∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]} be an optimal control trajectory
and let {x∗(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]} be the corresponding state trajectory, i.e.,
x˙(t) = f(x∗(t), u∗(t)), x∗(0) = x(0) : given
Let also p(t) be the solution of the adjoint equation
p˙ = −∇xH(x∗(t), u∗(t), p(t)),
with the boundary condition
p(T ) = ∇h(x∗(T )),
where h(·) is the terminal cost function. Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
u∗(t) = arg min
u∈U
H(x∗(t), u, p(t)).
Furthermore, there is a a constant C such that
H(x∗(t), u, p(t)) = C, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
2.10.2 Approximate Dynamic Programming.
With a continuous-time dynamic system based upon a nonlinear piece-wise differ-
ential equation such as
x˙i(t) =

0, if xi(t) +
∂xi
∂t
≤ 0;
fi (xi(t), u(t)) , if 0 < xi(t) +
∂xi
∂t
< 1;
1, if xi(t) +
∂xi
∂t
≥ 1.
(2.23)
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Figure 3. Graphical depiction of a rollout algorithm [12]
various problems with determining closed–form solutions arise. In cases like this,
the HJB equation does not apply. The field of approximate dynamic programming
addresses these types of problems. While it does not provide an true optimal solution
it provides near–optimal solutions to problems where an exact solution does not exist
or cannot be determined. One such type of technique is called rollout algorithms
which is a suboptimal control method that relies on a suboptimal policy, a base
heuristic.
2.10.3 Rollout Algorithms.
A rollout policy is a one–step lookahead policy with the optimal cost–to-go ap-
proximated by the cost–to–go of the base policy (J˜∗k+1) [11]. The basic formulation of
a rollout algorithm can be observed graphically in Figure 3. In Figure 3 at stage k,
given the current partial trajectory (Tk) which starts at x0 and ends at x¯k, the roll-
out algorithm evaluates all possible state transitions xk+1 = fk(x¯k, uk), uk ∈ Uk(x¯k),
and runs the base heuristic starting with xk+1. Then the approach finds a control
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u¯k ∈ Uk(x¯k) 3 T ck (u¯k) = Tk ∪ (u¯k) ∪H(x¯k+1) where x¯k+1 = fk(x¯k, u¯k), is feasible and
has a minimum cost.
Rollout algorithms for approximate solutions of discrete optimization problems are
shown in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [14]. Bertsekas, Tsitsiklis and Wu [15] provide roll-
out algorithms to address combinatorial optimization which improve the performance
of the base heuristic. Bertsekas and Castan˜on [13] developed rollout algorithms to find
near–optimal solutions to stochastic scheduling problems with considerable savings
in computation time over the base heuristic. In 2005 Bertsekas [16] applies rollout
algorithms to constrained deterministic programming problems. A 2005 and 2013
survey of Approximate Dynamic Programming and rollout algorithms provide rollout
algorithms for a wide range of discrete optimization problems [12], [17]. Applica-
tions of rollout algorithms are found in many fields to include: logistics [10] and [103];
vehicle routing [86], [67], [43] and [90]; and sensor scheduling [48] and [62]. Rollout
algorithms are not presented in any literature for use in nation–building problems.
2.11 Summary
In this chapter, a review of relevant background literature is presented to provide
the context for the creation of the system of differential equations model and the
application of dynamic programming in this field. The two key points from this sec-
tion are 1) the concept of the unilateral prescriptive model using the DIME-PMESII
paradigm and 2) the concept of using dynamic programming to solve these nation-
building problems.
After reviewing the literature there is a need for a prescriptive model which con-
siders the tools (DIME) that influence key macro level variables (PMESII). No model
addresses this need; several models consider populations (Lanchester type attrition
models) and some integrate external forces. Few models address more than one as-
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pect of DIME. The ones that do use it as a measure to determine force levels. There
is a distinct gap in literature concerning prescriptive models which consider a robust
set of tools the US can implement in nation building operations.
Additionally, the use of rollout algorithms in optimization problems is demon-
strated in the literature yet not in the social science fields, particulary in the context
of nation–building problems.
The model and algorithms presented in this dissertation specifically addresses
these gaps.
38
III. Investigating the Dynamics of Nation Building Through
a System of Differential Equations
3.1 Abstract
Nation–building modeling is an important field given the increasing number of
candidate nations and the limited resources available. In this research we present
a modeling methodology and a system of differential equations model to investigate
the dynamics of nation–building. The methodology is based upon solving inverse
problems, much like Lanchester Equations, and provides Measures of Merit (MoM)
to evaluate nation–building operations. An application is derived for Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) to demonstrate the utility as well as effects of various alternate strate-
gies, using differing applications of national power. This modeling approach is data
driven and offers a significant, novel capability when analyzing and planning for future
nation–building scenarios.
3.2 Introduction
The US has and continues to aid and assist those nations, when needed, in order
to prevent them from becoming safe–havens for terrorist and extremist activity and
develop a sustainable and viable peace. The use of an armed force and economic
aid to promote political and economic reform with the objective to assist a nation
in transition from conflict to peace (internally and bordering nations) is nation–
building [38]. These are not unilateral military or State Department operations,
but rather the synchronous effort of military and civilian, public and private, as
well as US and international efforts to provide assistance to the state or region in
need [88]. The National Security Presidential Directive 44 [23] and the National
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Security Strategy [69] state a key interest of the United States are those states which
are in transition or reconstruction.
According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations [35], there are four in-
struments of national power that can be applied by the US, these represent exogenous
actions on an operational environment; they are, diplomacy, informational, military,
and economic (DIME). Within the operational environment of a nation the Army
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations [36] describes six endogenous and interrelated
variables that describe its internal state and give insight to its progress; they are,
political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). This
is often referred to as the PMESII-DIME paradigm, where the effects of the DIME
actions are measured through PMESII.
Leading military operations analysts have conjectured that a system of differential
equations could be developed that demonstrate the effect of resources in nation–
building [21]. These variables, external and internal, form the basis of the nation–
building model described in this research. This problem takes the form of an inverse
problem. In an inverse problem, the results or effects of the problem are known and
measurable, but the model’s underlying structure, the cause, is uncertain [45]. Thus,
the nature of such problems is to resolve cause from effect. There exist models which
look at operational effectiveness, models which predict instability [87], models that
determine which countries are candidates to provide nation–building [59], and models
which determine a framework for scheduling reconstruction operations [27]. However,
there are no models which look at the tools available to conduct nation–building and
evaluate the impact through the variables which describe the operational environment
as indicated by [87] and [31]. A model, based on classical Lanchester models, would
be very useful “to describe effects of inputs and interactions of state variables.” [21]
40
This research develops a nation–building model through a solution methodology
to the inverse problem. A representative system of differential equations, using the
nation–building operations in Iraq as a framework is presented. Additionally, this
research shows how the endogenous operational variables (PMESII) can act as Mea-
sures of Merit (MoM), against which we can evaluate different applications of national
power (DIME).
The next section is a review of literature of the PMESII-DIME paradigm and
military applications of differential equations to inverse problems. In section three,
we describe our solution methodology by outlining our data; organizing the data into
different composite indices and MoM; then solve the system of differential equations.
Section four offers a description of the model to evaluate how our MoM are changed
when alternate strategies are undertaken by the US, using data from Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Finally, conclusions and future research are presented in the final
section.
3.3 PMESII-DIME Paradigm
The concept of the PMESII-DIME modeling paradigm has been prominent for sev-
eral years. With the beginning of the “Global War on Terror” the need for these type
of models increased as the US military and its coalition partners quickly overmatched
regimes and then became involved in lasting counterinsurgency and nation–building
operations.
The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) project in the mid–
2000s was important in several ways. First, while it did not make direct use of
PMESII, it did consider the political, security, rule of law, economic, and social
aspects of a country. Secondly, it addressed a gap in the current operations and policy.
This gap being a lack of metrics which assist in formulating policy and implementing
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operational and strategic plans to transform nations at risk or in conflict, and bring
stability to war-torn societies [39]. This identified a need for tools to address nation–
building operations; PMESII-DIME models could address this need.
Over the years there have been several tools which fit into this framework. A
partial list is provided by [44]. More recent approaches used to model PMESII-DIME
include a wargaming through the Peace Support Operation’s Model (PSOM) [20],
agent based tools such as Senturion [2], the Power Structure Toolkit (PTSK) [94],
and the intelligent agent approach demonstrated by [60]. Network models such as the
DynNetSim tool [3] and Polyscheme [25] can represent the multi-nodal and connected
aspect of PMESII-DIME. Bayesian networks are also popular tools that have been
used by [65], [75], and [58]. Other models combine several models to simulate and
influence behaviors such as the Conflict Modeling, Planning, and Outcome Explo-
ration system (COMPOEX) [53]. These models all make use of the PMESII-DIME
paradigm outlined in JP 3-0 and FM 3-0.
3.4 Differential Equation Models
Within military applications, one of the most famous treatments of inverse prob-
lems are Lanchester Equations. They have been the basis for many differential equa-
tion models involving combat, however they have also been documented in other ar-
eas, such as irregular warfare. [84], for example, used Lanchester Equations to model
guerilla warfare and asymmetric engagements while employing and operationaliz-
ing an array of variables and coefficients (representing weapons strength, discipline,
morale, etc.) to model an insurgent force in Phase II (strategic stalemate) of an
insurgency. [78] used a system of differential equations to model the arms race and
instability of nation states based upon the current levels of its neighboring and/or
menacing states.
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Many Lanchester equations involving several parameters and inputs can be formu-
lated as a system of differential equations. [18] model insurgency using this method
and parameters based upon the recruitment and effectiveness rates of coalition and
insurgent forces in OIF. [47] also derive a model which investigates the dynamics of
the insurgent population, this model makes use of the logistic differential equation
and the idea that there is carrying capacity involved. The model is then applied to
the insurgency in Malaya (1948-1960) and the first three years of OIF (2003-2006).
Both models make use of data from the Brookings Institution, Iraq Index [70]. In
2009 [1] provided the Formal Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Model
(FSROM) using a system of differential equations and seeming unrelated regression
estimation (SURE) to determine the optimal degree of foreign aid, multilateralism
(number of nations participating), and operation length. The model was tested using
instances of nation–building operations from post World War II through operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq with data from the [96]. In 2011 [5] present a Lanchester
model to study armed revolts, where success is largely determined by the population
instead of the initial force size.
The evolution of Lanchester Equations, from air combat to insurgent conflict to
political and economic problems, demonstrate how the application of inverse prob-
lems to warfare has come to model more complex ideas over time. The increasingly
complex and uncertain nature of warfare naturally lends itself to an inverse problem
application. We incorporate the political, military, economic, social, and infrastruc-
ture (PMESI) variables of the operational environment and the military and economic
(ME) instruments of national power . We rely on collected historical data from es-
tablished institutions (e.g. [96], Brookings Institute [70]) to inform our model. The
additional PMESII-DIME variables were excluded due to a lack of available data.
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3.5 Solution Methodology
The developed solution methodology to solve the inverse problem involves three
steps, depicted in Figure 4.
Data Collection
SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
(1) Data collection and index formation 
Data Sources
Calculate
Indices
Fitting Curves
and
Calculating
Fitting the 
Model to a 
System of 
(1) (2) (3)
(2) Fitting curves and calculating derivatives
(3) Fitting the model to a system of differential equations
Derivatives
Differential
Equations
Figure 4. Solution Methodology
Each step is described in the following sections, and later applied to OIF in Sec-
tion 3.6.
3.5.1 Data Collection and Index Formation.
The PMESI indices are formulated as composite indices. They represent a math-
ematical transformation (and aggregation) of different relevant indicators into one
value. The use of such indicators to reflect country performance is widely practiced
by several organizations (i.e. [96]). A survey by [6] details over 170 different composite
country performance measurements used in practice. The Handbook on Constructing
Composite Indicators [66], published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operations
and Development, notes that several key attributes (summarize complex realities, re-
duce indicators, assess nations over time, and compare complex dimensions) that
composite indices accomplish. Nardo et al. warn that the justification and con-
struction of composite indices lies in their fitness to the intended purpose and the
acceptance of peers. Following this, we build our composite indices following the
PMESI operational variables outlined in the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Opera-
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tions, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations and the literature referenced in
Section 3.3.
Define X ∈ {P,M,E, S, I} as the set of operational variables. Let X(j) represent
the jth component of X. Each X(j) is composed of a set of components or indicators,
i, with each of the i indicators containing n data points. We can see that n 7→ i, i 7→
X(j) ⇔ n 7→ X(j) where particular indicators are used to calculate one and only
one of the PMESI variables, X(j), and that X(j) represents the composite index at a
time, t; we will refer to this as X
(j)
t .
The indicators take measurements from the same operational environment, or
space; however, each of the data will vary in unit and range. To account for this, a
normalization technique is applied to place each indicator on a common [0, 1] scale.
To use the normalization we establish benchmark values, a best and worst value; this
is the maximum and minimum observation value over the entire range of observations
for each component. This ensures that all values will assume a normalized score on
a common scale. The result is that it assumes a normalized value according to the
established benchmarks and the raw score of the indicator. This allows for a common
comparison and allows for the weighting of the indicators to calculate and overall
index score, X
(j)
t .
Each indicator then can be assigned a weight, wi, which indicates the percentage
of an indicator to an index; the total weights must not exceed 1. The weighting
can be accomplished through various methods based on the preference of the analyst
and decision maker. The result is a set of index vectors organized by time. In this
application the weights are determined through the rank ordered centroid method
based on subject matter expert (SME) opinion.
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3.5.2 Curve Fitting and Calculating Derivatives.
A consideration in building these complex models is that the nature of the data
is complex and often difficult to interpret as well. The use of curve fitting and
smoothing is an available technique to observe the trend of data which may not be
readily apparent from the data itself. The use of this technique was demonstrated
with a complex composite index, the Dow Jones Industrial Index, by [49] to observe
trends while still considering the volatility of the market.
Due to the error injected into the data by measurement error and other sources,
we smooth the normalized data by fitting curves to each composite index. First, we
do this to capture the general trend of the data while still accounting for potential
noise. Thus, the generalized model, while not susceptible to extraordinary events,
can still account for them. Second, we calculate the derivatives of our fitted curve at
each point, t, and use them to approximate the derivative function of our operational
variables. This is an integral part in calculating the coefficients of the final system of
differential equations, completed in the third step.
The curve fitting process can be accomplished through various methods; however,
the method selected must pass an appropriate goodness–of–fit test based on the op-
erational situation and must place emphasis on matching the end effects. Due to the
curvilinearity of the data, a weighted polynomial regression is selected. Once a curve
has been fit, we have a general equation that will approximate the index values. From
this equation a derivative can be calculated which can then be used to approximate
a derivative for each t.
Through the first two steps of this process, observations of data over time are
collected and compiled into a composite index, which summarizes complex data and
assesses the progress over time as described by [66]. This develops a set of discrete
points which describe the current state of the PMESI variables at a time, t. The
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general trend of the data helps to describe its progress; to capture this trend a re-
gression technique is used. After selecting the proper fit, the PMESI indices can be
expressed as a function of time. The derivative of the function is then calculated and
used to determine the coefficients of the system of differential equations in the least–
squares minimization. Through this series of steps, mean–field theory was applied to
perform the necessary steps to determine the coefficients of the system of differential
equations in the next section.
3.5.3 Determine the Coefficients to the System of Differential Equa-
tions.
The model must encompass the interactions within the operational environment
and the corresponding endogenous variables. To introduce the interrelatedness we
conjecture a system of differential equations by setting the rate of change of each
PMESI variable equal to a function of the ME and PMESI factors. In its most
general form we have
x˙t = p(P,M,E, S, I) + d(Mil, Eco) (3.1)
where each PMESI derivative is a function of the PMESI indices and the ME forcing
functions. This ensures that the interconnected systems perspective described in JP
3-0, Joint Operations is incorporated and will facilitate the understanding of the
continuous and complex interactions within this dynamic system.
fi(x(t), u(t)) = ai1
(
Pt
bi1
− 1
)
+ ai2
(
Mt
bi2
− 1
)
+ ai3
(
Et
bi3
− 1
)
+ ai4
(
St
bi4
− 1
)
+ ai5
(
It
bi5
− 1
)
+ di1Milt + di2Ecot (3.2)
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To build the functional form of the model (Equation 3.2), we introduced three pa-
rameters, a, b, and d to the general equation. The a and d coefficients are the scaling
factors, representing the weight of the endogenous functions or the proportionality of
the endogenous function to the rate of change for a PMESI variable. The b coefficient
is the tipping point, it represents the point where a change in the parameter causes a
change in the dynamical property of the system, much like a bifurcation. The tipping
point represents a point when xt ≈ b the effect of a variable is generally stable, when
the value of xt > b there is a magnifying effect, and when xt < b there is a diminishing
effect. The d parameter is the scaling factor coefficients for the Mil and Eco forcing
functions. The range for aij, bij, and dik are
aij ∈ R for i,j=1,2,. . . ,5
bij ∈{R | 0 < bij ≤ 1} for i,j=1,2,. . . ,5
dik ∈ R for i=1,2,. . . ,5, for k=1,2
The full system of equations can be formed by creating an equation for each
X ∈ {P,M,E, S, I} which corresponds to the i; j is the index within each derivative,
and k corresponds to the forcing function.
This tipping point highlights the advantage of data driven model. Rather than
looking for a subjective assessment from a subject matter expert (SME) the observed
data determines the tipping point within the associated PMESI variable range, with
range [0, 1] By letting the data drive the value of the coefficients, the effect rela-
tive to the time period and the interrelatedness of the data can be evaluated. This
means when evaluating the military of a country that is building its strength, the
evaluation may be based upon the observations which demonstrate the development
of the military, and how they interact with the other variables in the operational
environment.
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The system of differential equations accurately describes the actual trends of our
operational variables, thus the system is fit to the derivatives of the fitted–curves
from the previous section. Many problems involve a large number of independent
variables where the exact calculation of such a problem is infeasible. In order to
solve these problems, efficient approximation techniques are needed in order to better
understand their dynamics. The method of using a Mean–Field Equation (MFE)
to approximate these dynamics is an efficient approximation method to aid in solv-
ing problems dealing with uncertainty and complexity [72]. This method has been
used by [51] to capture similar mean–field interactions. In order to solve for the a, b
and d coefficients a nonlinear least–squares minimization problem is utilized. The b
coefficients are restricted to the same range of the indices. The state indices are re-
stricted to the range [0, 1], thus the tipping points (b coefficients) must also be in the
range [0, 1]. To maintain indices within the prescribed range the system transitions
according to the following piecewise differential equation
x˙i(x(t), u(t)) =

0, if xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0;
fi (x(t), u(t)) , if 0 < xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) < 1;
0, if xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) ≥ 1.
(3.3)
The minimization problem is solved using the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG)
method for solving nonlinear programs. There are two points to note in this case:
1. Just like many nonlinear problems, the solution for aij, bij, and dik may not be
unique. It is typical that if there is more than one solution, then there is an
infinite number of solutions that satisfy the equations.
2. The solution provided is specific to the operational environment being studied.
There is no master set of coefficients or parameters that can be used for all
situations. The so–called “constant fallacy” described by [45] is often overlooked
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and leads researchers to believe they have found universal parameters when they
have in fact found parameters specific only to their study.
The results provide a mathematical expression of the operational environment,
but with far more insight and capability than the original fitted curves from the
previous section. Using the solved system of differential equations, modifications to
the instruments of national power used by the US in terms of military troops and
economic aid can be explored to see how these changes effect the evolution of the state
variables for the nation of interest undergoing nation-building while capturing the
interactions between the operational variables and the impact of external influences.
In the next section, the methodology described in Section 3.5 is implemented using
a data set from OIF. The implementation method and results, as well as analysis from
alternate ME strategies, are presented in Section 3.6.
3.6 Implementation
This section illustrates the utility of the model through an application of data
from OIF.
Data was collected to construct each of the PMESI variables starting with the be-
ginning of the war (March 2003) through December 2008 from the following sources:
Brookings Institution, Department of Defense, Department of State, and the CIA
Factbook. Each component was normalized, a notional weighting scheme developed,
and index values were calculated for each value, t. Each individual index is then plot-
ted as a time series. A 4th order polynomial expression is the result of the weighted
regression step. The 4th order polynomial was selected as it was the lowest order
polynomial with all indices having at R2 > .8 with matching end effects. The deriva-
tives of the 4th order polynomial equations at each point, t, are used to approximate
the derivative function of the operational variables.
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To fit the system of differential equations, the coefficients are solved for using the
nonlinear least–squares method. Using the nonlinear program, the values of aij, bij,
and dik coefficients are calculated which minimize the SSE. The a, b, and d coefficients
(truncated values shown here) are provided in Tables 1–2.
Table 1. a and b coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political (a) -0.0108181 -0.0200317 0.0000199 0.0040096 0.0035656
Military (a) 0.0743136 0.0168815 0.0002164 -0.0101848 -0.0241455
Economic (a) 0.0287454 0.0155291 -0.0008631 -0.0100445 -0.0156717
Social (a) -0.0005479 0.0001096 0.0004305 0.0246105 0.0021363
Infrastructure (a) 0.0034676 0.0008256 -0.0010147 -0.0264765 -0.0054859
Political (b) 0.3980158 0.6319466 0.0061526 0.0894118 0.1010944
Military (b) 0.9093994 0.5026149 0.5234950 0.1443637 0.6481461
Economic (b) 0.4439128 0.3606699 0.1873238 0.1093262 0.3084922
Social (b) 0.1788101 0.0781656 0.0700705 0.4343948 0.2960607
Infrastructure (b) 0.2387622 0.0769009 0.1342082 0.3479762 0.2603047
Table 2. d coefficients
i
k
Military Economic
Political -0.0074973 -0.0008035
Military 0.0230743 0.0007235
Economic 0.0184431 0.0007638
Social -0.0017058 0.0008385
Infrastructure 0.0049494 -0.0005529
The calculated derivatives indicate the rate of change in the system for each op-
erational variable. The derivatives provide useful information; however, if the rate of
change and a starting point are known, then a calculated index (Pˆ , Mˆ , Eˆ, Sˆ, Iˆ) can
be used to gain more insight. This is an initial value problem. One method of solv-
ing first-order differential equations with a numerical method is the Euler method,
which uses the derivative and the initial value to estimate the solution (uk+1 =
uk+hak for k = 0, 1, . . . , n where ak = u
′
k and h is the step size [42]). Through an ap-
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plication of this method, the index values can be estimated through the knowledge of
an initial value and the derivatives provided from the system of differential equations.
The forward Euler method is unstable if any of the eigenvalues (λ) have 0 or positive
real parts. In linear form the model can be expressed as Ax+Bu+c where A is a ma-
trix of
aij
bij
, B is the matrix of dik coefficients and c is the vector containing the the sum
of aij for each i. Although λ = [0.0414,−0.0019−0.0361i,−0.0019+0.0361i,−0.002, 0]
and indicates that ∂
∂t
→ ±∞ for some values; X˙i(t) is truncated to values between 0
and 1 according to Equation 3.3. Using this method, with h = 1, the approximate
index is calculated and compared to the original index values in Figure 5.
An Anderson-Darling Goodness-of-Fit test (Table 3) was conducted using [64].
The results indicate that the Political, Military, and Infrastructure error are normally
distributed, indicating the successful application of the mean-field approximation.
Table 3. Anderson-Darling Goodness of Fit
α = 0.05
Political 0.560
Military 0.427
Economic < 0.05
Social < 0.05
Infrastructure 0.145
Given the quality of the data and the nature of the problem this is not entirely
unexpected. This indicates the mean-field method captures the general trend of
the variable it is approximating when the data that provides the approximation is
appropriate. The inference here is that the data which builds the Economic and Social
indices may be biased, collection methods may have changed, or the data needs to be
improved, indicating an area for possible future research.
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Figure 5. Calculated Indices versus Actual Indices– The solid lines represent the cal-
culated indices from the model using the Euler method and the points are the actual
monthly index values.
53
3.7 What–If Analysis
In this section the methodology is applied to evaluate two alterative strategies
which reflect possible modifications to the military influence as applied by the US in
Iraq. The following sections organize modifications to economic and military data
(on the side of the US) into different strategies. These modifications are derived from
actual implemented plans, proposed legislation from Congress, and demonstrate the
what-if analysis feature of the model.
3.7.1 The No Surge Alternative.
On the 10th of January 2007, President George W. Bush delivered a speech to
the American Public outlining a new strategy in Iraq. As part of that strategy he
called for the additional deployment of 20, 000 US troops, the majority deploying
to Baghdad to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, help them protect the
population, and help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing
the security needed [24]. The first deployment of troops was in January 2007 and in
July 2007 all surge troops had been deployed. The surge would last to July 2008 and
was roughly an increase of 28, 000 troops [70].
The actual US troop numbers for the Milt variable represent the surge strategy
and serve as the base case for evaluating the alternate strategies. In order to evaluate
the no surge strategy, the Milt are adjusted under the assumption that if the surge
was not implemented, the number of troops would have remained the same during
for the time period. Therefore, the number of troops are held constant from the
January 2007 level through February 2009 (when the troop level returned to near the
pre–surge level). All other variables remain the same, specifically the coefficients are
not changed as the goal is to evaluate the alternative strategy under the conditions
that took place. In other words, if everything else remained the same how would the
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indices have been affected by the no surge policy? The results are shown in Figure 6.
The observation here is how the indices change over time based on a different troop
level, while keeping all other variables constant. The change in Milt variables did have
impacts on all PMESI index variables, some more than others. The plots are identical
up until month 48 when the surge began, and then takes a different trajectory based
upon the changes in the Milt variables and the corresponding interactions from the
PMESI index variables. As a result, the trajectory of the Political and Social indices
did not differ greatly from the original values over time while the Military, Economic,
and Infrastructure trajectories decreased over time. 95% confidence intervals were
calculated at the end of the 70 month time period that show that these differences,
given this data and model, would not be statistically significant.
3.7.2 A Complete Reduction by 2008 Alternative.
In March–July of 2007, Congress proposed a series of resolutions that would lead
to the removal of US troops in Iraq. The first one, House Resolution (H.R.) 1951
was passed by Congress and vetoed by President Bush; H.R. 2956 was passed by the
House and required the Secretary of Defense to initiate the reduction of troops in
Iraq immediately through April 1, 2008. This resolution was then sent to the Senate
where it was narrowly defeated 52-47. This resolution was never introduced again
and the current surge plan continued as outlined in January of 2007 [95].
To evaluate the potential impact of the withdrawal strategy, we assume that the
March Resolution passed and the number of troops were reduced in even increments
over the next year leading to no troops in April 2008. All other variables remain the
same, as in the previous case. In other words, if everything else remained the same
how would a phased withdrawal implemented in 2007 affect the indices? The results
are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 6. No Surge (dashed line) vs Surge (solid line)– The calculated index plots from
the model using the Euler method to compare the alternative strategy (No Surge) to
the actual strategy (Surge).
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Figure 7. Withdrawal (dashed line) vs No Withdrawal (solid line)– The calculated
index plots from the model using the Euler method to compare the alternative strategy
(Withdrawal) to the actual strategy (No Withdrawal).
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The observation here is how the indices changed over time based upon the with-
drawal troop level and timeline, with all other variables constant. The change in the
Milt variables did have effects on all the variables, some more than others. The plots
are exactly identical up until month 50 where the withdrawal began and then takes
on a different trajectory, based upon the interactions from the different data. As a
result, the trajectory of all indices except Social decreased over time, with signifi-
cant deviations from the actual plot in the Military, Economic, and Infrastructure
variables. After interpreting the results it can be seen that the withdraw policy had
projected impacts on all of the PMESI indices.
As conjectured, the model provides a means to investigate various strategies
through changing the inputs into the model. Changing an exogenous variable may re-
sult in a difference which can have an increasing or decreasing effect. One can observe
that there are rewards and costs associated with changing the inputs dependent on
the interrelated dynamics. Once again, it is important to note this set of coefficients
and equations are based on the data used to build the model.
3.8 Conclusion
In support of efforts to develop analytical methods for use in Irregular Warfare
operations, this research develops a methodology that addresses nation–building and
accounts for the impacts of the instruments of national power. The developed model
captures the interrelatedness and complexities reflective of an actual operational en-
vironment.
The shift in warfare as described in FM 3-0 has gone from around the people to
among the people [36]. This change marks a new paradigm beyond how we fight
and into how we plan our operations. The ability to measure the PMESII variables
parallels the work performed by military planners. If operations are planned in this
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context, it makes sense to measure and evaluate them in the same context. Developed
models provide insight to analysts and decision makers on the application of the
instruments of national power in terms of the operational environment.
The developed model methodology is data driven and offers a significant, novel
approach that allows wargaming, analyzing, and planning future nation–building op-
erations. The methodology provides the ability to inform strategic resource alloca-
tion decisions during ongoing nation–building operations. Historical examples may
be modeled and analyzed using this methodology to develop an integrated compre-
hensive approach to future nation–building.
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IV. An Approximate Dynamic Programming Approach to
Resource Allocation for Nation–Building Problems
4.1 Abstract
The challenges of nation–building are faced by governments when assisting failing
or failed states. At the base of this challenge exists a resource allocation problem;
how to apply limited resources in a manner to maximize measurable outcomes or min-
imize costs. Treating the nation–building problem as a resource allocation problem
requires several operations research and mathematical techniques. An approximate
dynamic programming (ADP) formulation and techniques are developed to address
this problem and are implemented using a system of differential equations model of
the nation–building operations in Iraq to evaluate the allocation of resources. Multi-
ple cost functions and base heuristics are presented to develop significantly improved
policies for given objective functions.
4.2 Introduction
One modern approach to nation building is defined as
the use of an armed force as part of a broader effort to promote po-
litical and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society
emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors [38].
This is not a new concept; in the history of the United States (US) alone there are 19
armed conflicts which can be categorized as nation building operations [73]. While
this problem is not as well defined as classic optimization problems, this research will
show how approximate dynamic programming (ADP), specifically rollout algorithms,
can address the problem of nation–building. For this dynamic programming approach
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a system of differential equations model that captures the effect of external influences
on the rate of change of a state of a nation is used. Significant improvement in the
objective function value is achieved for several objective functions.
The literature addresses modeling the nation-building problem (or a sub-set such
as counterinsurgency operations) through several different methods such as systems
dynamics models, Lanchester equation and differential equation models. Richard-
son [77] created a systems dynamics model to capture post-reconstruction operations
at a national level which Robbins [79] then modified for regional analysis. Pier-
son [76] developed the famous “spaghetti” diagram of the counterinsurgency effort in
Afghanistan and then Minami and Kucik [63] applied a similar effort to Iraq using
systems dynamics models. In 2008, Blank et al [18], developed a dynamic model
of insurgency using Lanchester equations and Iraq war data. The model proposes a
system of differential equations, the general solution of which is then used to plot
the phase portraits of the system and deduce information. Johnson and Madin [47]
developed a population model based upon the Logistic differential equation. This
model makes use of population size, recruitment, carrying capacity, and mortality to
investigate the dynamics in the insurgent population.
In 2009, Abdollahian et al. [1] provided the Formal Stabilization and Reconstruc-
tion Operations Model (FSROM) using a system of differential equations and Seem-
ing Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) determine the optimal degree of for-
eign aid, multilateralism (number of nations participating), and operation length.
Tauer, Nagi, and Sudit [93] formulated a simplified version of the model by Richard-
son [77] as a Markov decision process and used a Reduced Approximate Linear Pro-
gram (RALPHHE ) for the H-neighborhood around an initial state x0, and assuming a
given expert’s policy piE. This was used to model the transition between population
classes (Unemployed, Private, Government).
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Arney and Arney [4] use a large scale system of differential equations and a net-
work structure to model counter-insurgency and coalition operations in stages. The
network model describes the collaboration link between nodes while the system of dif-
ferential equations provides the metrics to evaluate operations. Saie and Ahner [81]
propose a model system of differential equations model to address the nation–building
problem using a paradigm based on military planning variables. An updated version
of this model provides the use case for this research’s resource allocation.
Rollout algorithms are a type of ADP technique that is often used to solve complex
problems that have no closed form solution. This occurs when the state space and/or
control space is large and exceeds the computational capacity of computers. Rollout
algorithms use a heuristic to approximate the future cost or reward of a current deci-
sion. Rollout algorithms for approximate solutions of discrete optimization problems
are shown in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [14]. Bertsekas, Tsitsiklis and Wu [15] provide
rollout algorithms to address combinatorial optimization which improve the perfor-
mance of the base heuristic. Bertsekas and Castan˜on [13] developed rollout algorithms
to find near–optimal solutions to stochastic scheduling problems with considerable
savings in computation time over the base heuristic. In 2005 Bertsekas [16] applies
rollout algorithms to constrained deterministic programming problems. A 2005 [12]
and 2013 [17] survey of Approximate Dynamic Programming and rollout algorithms
provide rollout algorithms for a wide range of discrete optimization problems. Ap-
plications of rollout algorithms are found in many fields to include: logistics [10]
and [103]; resource allocation [52], [101] [28], and [61]; vehicle routing [86], [67], [43]
and [90]; and sensor scheduling [48] and [62]. Rollout algorithms are not presented in
any literature for use in nation–building problems.
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4.3 Dynamic Programming Formulation
Our formulation addresses the resource allocation problem as applied to nation–
building operations in order to improve the state of the country. A system of differen-
tial equations represents the dynamics of a nations state, to include the effect of the
resources allocated. Using the differential equation, a per period and total amount
of resources are applied using a specified objective function to achieve maximum im-
provement. This problem is one the US has faced for the past decade in Afghanistan
and Iraq. This is not a unique problem to the US, as recently as 2013 the United
Nations (UN) and France were compelled to intervene in Mali to restore peace and
conduct nation–building operations.
Consider a country that is unstable and the goal is to employ assets to provide
support to that nation. The total amount of resources and when they are allocated are
critical questions to be addressed. We will adopt the PMESI-ME (PMESI–political,
military, economic, social, and infrastructure; ME– military and economic) paradigm
described in [81] and add the diplomatic instrument yielding PMESI-DME.
The model selected for this research uses the DME as inputs and the PMESI as the
measures of merit, the outputs. Each objective is a function of these PMESI variables
and each variable is formed as an index, made of components and subcomponents and
aggregated to a [0, 1] scale as described in Saie and Ahner [81]. Every index is com-
posed of open source data derived from the Brookings Institute [71], World Bank [96],
CIA factbook [26], and various Department of Defense sources. The remainder of this
section describes how this problem is formulated as a dynamic programming problem
and solved using rollout algorithms.
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4.3.1 Dynamic Programming Requirements.
A general deterministic dynamic programming problem formulation must meet
the following requirements:
1. discrete time system of the form xk+1 = fk(xk, uk),
2. control constraint, that is, uk ∈ Uk(xk),
3. additive costs of the form h(xN) +
∑N−1
k=0 g(xk, uk),
4. optimization over (closed-loop) policies, rules for choosing uk for each k and
each possible value of xk.
The formulation that follows demonstrates each of these requirements.
4.3.2 States.
We define the states as the PMESI variables and describe the state of the system
(country) by
xt = {Pt,Mt, Et, St, It}
where the initial state, x0 is given and the state at any time (in months), t ∈ T is
such that xt ∈ [0, 1]5.
4.3.3 Control and Decision Space.
The control space is defined as the DME variables and represent the set of actions
an external government can take while conducting nation–building operations. The
set Ut(xt) of feasible controls ut(xt) that can be applied to xt are
ut = {Dipt,Milt, Ecot}
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where t is in months. The Ut are non–negative real (R+) numbers and are constrained
according to the actual constraints based on the actual data in the problem.
Diplomatic The diplomatic variable (Dipt) is the percentage of diplomatic assis-
tance where 0 is no assistance (host nation run government), 1 is a govern-
ment run with external support, and 0.5 represents an approximately equal
effort between the two nations. The total amount of diplomatic support must
not exceed 70 as the max per time period is 1 and there are 70 time periods,∑70
t=0Dipt ≤ 70.
Military The military variable (Milt) is the total number of US troops per month
(in 100,000s). The maximum number of troops for any t is 1.71 based on the
actual data thus 0 ≤ Milt ≤ 1.71 ∀ t. The total number of troops over the
entire time period (70 months) was 98.946 (multiples of 100k) which gives us
0 ≤ ∑70t=0Milt ≤ 98.946.
Economic The economic variable (Ecot) is the total amount of aid allocated per
month (in billions of US dollars). The maximum aid for any t is $1.63 billion
based on the actual data thus 0 ≤ Ecot ≤ 1.63 ∀ t. The total number of
aid over the entire time period (70 months) was 34.15 (in billions of US dollars)
yielding 0 ≤ ∑70t=0Ecot ≤ 34.15.
The decision space is continuous, ui(t) ∈ [a, b]3, where a and b are constrained based
upon the specified constraints for each control. The constraints represent the total
amount applied for each resource for a current time period (t) and the entire time pe-
riod (T ). All values are strictly non–negative and are based upon the actual minimum
and maximum values that occurred in the first 70 months of operations in Iraq. The
diplomatic variable (u1) is based upon a percentage of diplomatic assistance where 0
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is no assistance (host nation run government) and 1 is a government ran by external
nation support.
As the decision space contains an infinite number of points for the Mil and Eco
inputs a Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced (NOB) Mixed Design [98] is utilized to
effectively explore and evaluate the decision space. This provides 1200 distinct com-
binations of points to construct, U . A mixed design provides both discrete and con-
tinuous factor levels in the design. This chosen design simplifies the decision space,
the Dip resource is given three possible values, a 0, 0.5, or 1 and the Mil and Eco re-
sources remain continuous within their constrained values. This prevents the analyst
from trying to determine or describe a 37% allocation of the Dip resource. The design
is built using a spreadsheet [99] which provides the NOB design. At each epoch the
resources are applied and the amount available is decremented accordingly. If the
resource reaches an amount where the design level for a resource exceeds the amount
remaining, that specific combination of controls is not allowable.
4.3.4 System Dynamics.
The system dynamics are represented by the following piecewise differential equa-
tion
x˙i(x(t), u(t)) =

0, if xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) ≤ 0;
fi (x(t), u(t)) , if 0 < xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) < 1;
0, if xi(t) + fi(x(t), u(t)) ≥ 1.
(4.1)
Where
fi(x(t), u(t)) = ai1
(
Pt
bi1
− 1
)
+ ai2
(
Mt
bi2
− 1
)
+ ai3
(
Et
bi3
− 1
)
+ ai4
(
St
bi4
− 1
)
+ ai5
(
It
bi5
− 1
)
+ di1Dipt + di2Milt + di3Ecot (4.2)
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for each PMESI index, that is i = 1, ..., 5, and the system transitions according to
xt+1 = xt + x˙(t) · δ.
The system dynamics (Eq. 4.1) are represented with a piecewise differential equa-
tion ensuring the index function remains in its allowable range [0, 1]. The values
(truncated) for the coefficients described in Equation 4.2 are provided in Tables 4–6.
Table 4. a coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political 0.0106437 -0.0221477 0.00031723 -0.0396859 0.00562973
Military -0.0025072 0.03844424 -0.0036273 -0.0212282 -0.01407430
Economic -0.0386417 0.03556194 -0.0147303 -0.0773608 -0.01060570
Social 0.00740749 -0.0035113 0.0029288 0.00325991 0.00148458
Infrastructure -0.0103829 0.01578294 -0.0059614 -0.0141289 -0.00670700
Table 5. b coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political 0.32133939 0.94540904 0.05862982 0.97972602 0.32210496
Military 0.04389981 0.99563757 0.20158519 0.18429704 0.43206841
Economic 0.50913874 0.76465212 0.29503016 0.30240614 0.15591104
Social 0.75066697 0.61073867 0.35418124 0.22252805 0.12886480
Infrastructure 0.33070316 0.79409341 0.33970810 0.34378095 0.24653597
4.3.5 Objective Functions.
The nature of the this problem makes it such that a cost is difficult to define
and no objective functions exist which are commonly accepted. In this research we
present three costs, c(xt, ut) to serve as possible objective functions. Since the goal of
this problem is improve the state, mathematically we accomplish this by maximizing
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Table 6. d coefficients
i
k
Diplomatic Military Economic
Political 0.00163305 -0.0516518 -0.0005696
Military -0.0021241 0.15097297 -0.0044780
Economic -0.0063144 0.17781749 -0.0079398
Social 0.00137478 -0.0097472 0.0003528
Infrastructure -0.0028405 0.05210194 -0.0013781
the area under the definite integral, or by minimizing the the distance between xi(t)
and 1 with or without assigning a penalty to values further away from 1. All three
objective functions are explored.
Reimann Sum
(−∑5i=1 f (xi(t)) ∆xi(t)), this objective function maximizes the to-
tal sum of the indices. Since each index value corresponds with a month (t) and
is bounded by [0, 1] they form a definite integral which can be approximated
through a Reimann sum. This objective function is referred to as Reimann in
Section 4.5.
Penalty Function
(∑5
i=1 (1− xi(t))
)
, this objective function minimizes the sum of
the distances between the index value and the max index value of 1. This
objective function is referred to as Penalty in Section 4.5.
Squared Penalty Function
(∑5
i=0 (100− 100xi(t))2
)
, this objective function is sim-
ilar to the penalty function. This minimizes the squared distance between index
value and the max index value of 1. Each index is scaled by a factor of 100 so
the act of squaring the penalty has an increasing affect. This creates a greater
penalty for an index value which is further away from 1. This objective function
is referred to as Squared Penalty in Section 4.5.
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In dynamic programming we consider both the current cost, c(xt, ut) and the
future costs as given by Bellman’s equation
J(xt, ut) = min
ut
ct(xt, ut) + J(xt+1). (4.3)
However, due to the nonlinear system dynamics, we approximate J(xt+1) using a
heuristic approach to obtain J˜(xt+1), an approximation.
4.4 Rollout Algorithm
A Rollout Algorithm is an ADP technique to solve problems which fall victim to
Bellman’s “curse of dimensionality” where there is an exponential increase in com-
putation as the problem size increases. In Section 4.3.2 and 5.3.2 the states space
and decision space are defined as Euclidean spaces, R5 and R3. In order to achieve
computational tractability, the numerical solution of this problem is discretized for
each state and control index at each stage. The computation required to carry out
each calculation even with this simplification is overwhelming and a closed form so-
lution is not possible. To address this issue a rollout algorithm which makes use
of a one-step lookahead scheme and a sub–optimal policy (a base heuristic) which
implements the cost–to–go policy of the base heuristic to approximate the optimal
cost–to–go is developed. Using this method an approximate control, u˜t corresponding
to xt is calculated by J˜(xt+1), an approximation of J
∗(xt+1). The base heuristic is
repeatedly applied at each stage., the system is transitioned to the next time step,
and an approximate cost to go (J˜) is calculated. This provides an efficient method
to select u˜t(xt) = arg minu∈U c(xt, ut) + J˜ where c(xt, ut) is the cost–to–go. At every
time period, the control which minimizes (u˜t(xt)) is selected and applied before the
system transitions to the next state.
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4.4.1 Base Heuristics.
A total of three base heuristics will be explored each providing an efficient means
to calculate J˜(xt+1). In order to increase the importance of improved indices in later
periods, weighting is introduced. Each objective function is weighted by the value of
t to place more value on future states.
Average – The average policy allocates an equal amount of resources for each future
time period. The remaining resources are applied to future states equally. This
is accomplished by dividing the remaining resource by the number of remaining
time periods (T − t).
Decreasing – This policy allocates resources for each future time period according
to a linear decreasing function. A linearly decreasing line from the current time
period to the final time period is fit which applies resources in a monotonically
decreasing fashion ensuring that all resources are exhausted and the maximum
monthly constraint is not violated. This fit dynamically adjusts each time step
to calculate J˜ for that decision.
Increasing – This policy allocates resources for each future time period according
to a linear increasing function. A linearly increasing line from the current time
period to the final time period is fit which applies resources in a monotonically
increasing fashion ensuring that all resources are exhausted and the maximum
monthly constraint is not violated. This fit dynamically adjusts at each time
step to calculate J˜ for that decision.
Algorithm Rollout Algorithm for the Constrained Nation–Building Problem
1. Start at t = 1.
2. Construct U˜ based on 1200 distinct combinations of points (NOB design) and
initial state vector, x0.
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3. repeat
4. For all feasible u˜t ∈ U˜ calculate xt+1 = xt + x˙(xt, u˜t).
5. J˜t+2 =
∑T
k=t+2 c(xk, uk) where the base heuristic is calculated by applying
one or a combination of the three heuristics.
6. Evaluate c(xt+1, ut+1) + J˜t+2.
7. u˜t+1 = arg minu˜ c(xt+1, ut+1) + J˜t+2.
8. Calculate xt+1 by applying u˜t(xt).
9. Increment t by 1.
10. until t = T
4.5 Results
Using the first 70 months of data from Iraq the algorithm is applied to determine
if a better per month allocation strategy exists with the same or less total amount
of resources. To determine this, all three heuristics and weighted objective functions
were tested, the average runtime (with a 2.5GHz quad-core Intel Core i7) was 171
seconds (standard deviation of 9 seconds) for runs 1-3, 5-7, and 9-11 and 568 seconds
(standard deviation of 55 seconds) for runs 4, 8 and 12 as they run each of the
heuristics at each time period. The results from each run is provided in Table 7.
From Table 7 we can see that using the rollout ADP approach with both the
Reimann sum and the penalty function objective functions demonstrated similar im-
provement regardless of the heuristic. With runs 1-3 the improvement in the objective
function values and the control policies were the same for all 3 runs. The same occurs
for runs 9-11 as well. The squared penalty objective function resulted in 3 vary-
ing levels of improvement and 3 slightly different control polices, all of the squared
penalty policies make no use of the military resource. Generally the PMESI states
exhibit a similar pattern- political decreases military, economic, and infrastructure
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Table 7. Comparison of the Objective Functions and Base Heuristics to the Actual
Data
Run Objective Function Heuristic New Base % Difference
1 Reimann Average 193.72 161.26 20%
2 Reimann Decreasing 193.72 161.26 20%
3 Reimann Increasing 193.72 161.26 20%
4 Reimann All 238.31 161.26 48%
5 Squared Penalty Average 5.90E+07 7.35E+07 20%
6 Squared Penalty Decreasing 5.47E+07 7.35E+07 26%
7 Squared Penalty Increasing 5.91E+07 7.35E+07 20%
8 Squared Penalty All 5.88E+07 7.35E+07 20%
9 Penalty Average 163.09 186.12 12%
10 Penalty Decreasing 163.09 186.12 12%
11 Penalty Increasing 163.09 186.12 12%
12 Penalty All 148.46 186.12 20%
increase; and social remains in the neighborhood of its start point. In cases where
the economic resource is exhausted the military, economic, and infrastructure indices
drop drastically and the political increases with no major change to the social index.
When solving the problem using the all 3 heuristics for each objective function the
Reimann sum is clearly the best with 48% improvement over all heuristics using that
objective function. The Reimann and Penalty objective functions found improved
polices based on their objective function values over all of their heuristics applied
individually whereas the squared penalty achieves a similar result to the average and
decreasing heuristics (run 5 and 6). When comparing the results from the runs using
just one heuristic, one can observe that all objective function values increased 12-20%
and only the Squared Penalty with the decreasing heuristic provided a different result
than the runs with that objective function. Both the Reimann and Penalty objective
functions performed identically regardless of the heuristic.
While the optimization functions varied, all presented a significant and consistent
improvement. Each of the heuristics and objective functions provided improved re-
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sults in every case. As an example the state and control plot for run 4 is provided
in Figure 8 and 9. From Figure 8 we can observe that the military, economic, and
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(a) Political
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Military
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) Economic
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(d) Social
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(e) Infrastructure
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
Figure 8. States from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function– The solid line
represents the trajectory provided by the RO solution and the points represent the
actual index values for the given time period.
infrastructure indices experienced an immediate and drastic improvement. The social
index despite starting lower than the actual values improved over time as well. How-
ever, the political index dropped and remained below its start point while achieving
an index value of 0 for periods of time during which the other indices continue to im-
prove. The control policy that accompanies these states involved military resources
only in the last 20 months with varying levels, economic resources were applied early
on and then in the last 20 months, while the diplomatic resources were nearly con-
stantly applied at the highest level, a US lead government. perhaps giving insight to
the political state. It is interesting to note that military resources are often needed
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Figure 9. Controls from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function
to achieve starting conditions for the nation building–problem, in this case it may be
impractical to withdraw resources only to reapply later in the time period.
In most of the other cases the level of military resources were low and not fre-
quently applied while higher levels of diplomatic and economic resources were used
frequently for prolonged periods of time. The only exception to this is run 12 which
made use of all three resources for longer periods of time. The rollout resource alloca-
tion used the maximum economic resource 8 times (runs 3-7 and 11-12) and none of
the military resources 4 times (runs 2 and 9-11). Overall, the policies generated from
the rollout algorithms included significantly fewer military resources, and slightly less
of the economic resource. The comparison is found in Table 8.
Overall, this effort demonstrates that the use of rollout algorithms has the poten-
tial to improve resource allocation for this nation–building model. Further research
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Table 8. Comparison of resource allocation (% less than actual)– The allocation for all
12 runs compared to the actual allocation and the % less resources used.
1 2 3 4
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
66 19.71 22.39 45 0 30.289 44.5 9.09 34.144 34 11.97 34.151
-6% -80% -34% -36% -100% -11% -36% -91% 0% -51% -88% 0%
5 6 7 8
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
34 11.97 34.151 34 11.97 34.151 34 11.97 34.151 34 11.97 34.151
-51% -88% 0% -51% -88% 0% -51% -88% 0% -51% -88% 0%
9 10 11 12
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
18 0 29.941 23 0 32.522 29 0 34.15 34 11.97 34.151
-74% -100% -12% -67% -100% -5% -59% -100% 0% -51% -88% 0%
may be done with objective functions and the heuristics, as well as implementing
additional constraints to prevent rapid military resource changes (i.e. assume groups
of troops such as 5,000 per unit and assign them for periods of time).
Implementing a rollout algorithm to determine an improved solution for the allo-
cation of resources was at least 12% and up to 48% better than the actual allocation
based on the objective functions considered.
4.6 Conclusion
This research introduces the concept of rollout algorithms to the nation–building
problem by demonstrating its applicability through an example using a system of
differential equations model and 70 months of data from Iraq. The use of rollout al-
gorithms is shown to present vastly improved policies using various objective functions
and base heuristics. Given the complexity of this problem, this approach indicates
how these algorithms may be used to address this class of problem by providing
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policies which improve the state of the country. The results also suggest that this
technique may be applied to other types of social–science type problems which require
the allocation of limited resources with nonlinear dynamics with similar success.
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V. Augmented State Based Violence in Nation–Building
Modeling using Approximate Dynamic Programming
5.1 Abstract
Nation–building actions take place amongst the population and as a result, vio-
lence is always a concern. The nation–building problem is formulated as a dynamic
programming resource allocation problem and modeled with the enemy action of vio-
lence. The augmentation of the state vector with the violence factor allows feedback
to the state in terms of enemy actions while approximate dynamic programming
is applied to allocate how to apply limited resources in a manner that maximizes
measurable outcomes or minimize costs. Approximate dynamic programming is im-
plemented through an example consisting of a system of differential equations model
of the nation–building operations in Iraq to evaluate the allocation of resources and
number of civilian deaths. Multiple cost functions and base heuristics are presented
to develop significantly improved policies for given objective functions.
5.2 Introduction
Violence and casualties are often an outcome of armed conflicts, which includes
nation–building operations. In the more intense conflicts, such as wars, the number
of casualties may be one of several metrics to evaluate success. In earlier times, this
often determined the outcome of the battle or war. Lanchester theory [55] is a field of
operations research dedicated to this premise and makes use of differential equations
to evaluate the strength of two armies as a function of time. In these equations
the outcome is determined by the initial strength and effectiveness of each army to
determine the rate of change for the enemy (x) and ally (y) strength, by using existing
data. Lanchester equations are used to model many conflicts [100, 22, 41, 97, 56] and
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different types of warfare [55, 78, 32, 84, 85, 37] to measure the population of two
forces. These equations are applied to conventional warfare consisting of two armed
populations. More recently, conflict consists of battles, not fought in open fields or
unpopulated areas but rather in populated areas where civilian casualties are a factor.
This is especially true in nation–building operations were the goal is a to improve the
state of the country and the majority of actions center around the population. In this
case the civilian casualties may be one indicator of success or failure, but regardless
if used or not as a metric, casualties influence the state of nation–building. If the
number of casualties is low the external and host nation forces can view that as a
success, peace is maintained and the people are secure. If that number is high, then
it may be viewed as failure with violence prevalent and little or no security for the
populace, which may affect the development of a nation. The insurgent or militant
force can use civilian casualties to coerce and intimidate people and to disparage the
external forces and host nation.
The nation–building problem attempts to model external inputs in order to im-
prove the conditions of the country from a conflict state to a peaceful state through
input from an external nation. The nation-building problem (or a sub-set such as
counterinsurgency operations) is addressed in the literature through Lanchester equa-
tion and differential equation models. In 2008, Blank et al [18], developed a dynamic
model of insurgency using Lanchester equations and Iraq war data. The model pro-
poses a system of differential equations, the general solution of which is then used
to plot the phase portraits of the system and deduce information. Johnson and
Madin [47] developed a population model based upon the Logistic differential equa-
tion. This model makes use of population size, recruitment, carrying capacity, and
mortality to investigate the dynamics in the insurgent population. Schaffer [83] pro-
vides a mathematical formulation of 21st Century counterinsurgency warfare using
78
two stochastic time series. Kress and Szechtman [54] model the dynamic relationships
among intelligence, collateral casualties in the population, attrition, recruitment to
the insurgency, and reinforcement to the government force to show that an insurgency
can not be totally eradicate by force, additional actions which affect the attitude of
the population are needed as well. Saie and Ahner [81] propose a system of differen-
tial equations model to address the nation–building problem using a paradigm based
on military planning variables. Here we extend Saie and Ahner [81] to include not
only inputs from an external nation but factors (enemy actions) that actively work
against moving to a peaceful state.
5.3 Model Including Violence
Since enemy action information is not readily obtainable in nation–building oper-
ations, violence in the form of civilian deaths acts a a proxy for these enemy actions
within the model. To implement the act of violence in this model Princeton’s Empir-
ical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) dataset is used to calculate the number of deaths as a
result of insurgent action. From this ESOC dataset we calculate the total number of
casualties by month in the first 70 months of the Iraq war. These are only casualties
caused by insurgent forces and not coalition forces, which are assumed to be a rep-
resentation of the current state of the country. The type of casualties concerned are
the result of small arms and mortar fire, bombs and other explosive devices, as well
as intimidation killings and murder. When some of the casualties for large events are
provided using high and low estimates, the sample mean of those estimates is used
for modeling. This provides a number of casualties for each month. We build from
Section 4.3 and Equation 4.2 by adding another element to the model. Let V ∈ Z+
be defined as the number of casualties in a given time period t.
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5.3.1 Augmenting the State Vector.
We maintain the states as the PMESI variables and augment the state vector with
the new variable, Vt. From Equation 5.3 the key variables in determining the number
of casualties are the political and military variables. One can assume that the level
of violence in a country will impact the state of that country, so the augmentation of
the state vector with the violence is justified.
We now describe the state of the system (country) by
xt = {Pt,Mt, Et, St, It, Vt}
where the initial state, x0 is given and the state at any time (in months), t ∈ T is
such that Pt,Mt, Et, St, It ∈ [0, 1]5 and Vt ∈ Z+.
5.3.2 Control and Decision Space.
The control space is defined as the DME variables and represent the set of actions
an external government can take while conducting nation–building operations. The
set Ut(xt) of feasible controls ut(xt) that can be applied to xt are
ut = {Dipt,Milt, Ecot}
where t is in months. The Ut are non–negative real (R+) numbers and are constrained
according to the problem. The decision space is continuous, ui(t) ∈ [a, b]3, where a
and b are constrained based upon the specified constraints for each control. The con-
straints represent the total amount applied for each resource for a current time period
(t) and the entire time period (T ). All values are strictly non–negative and are based
upon the actual minimum and maximum values that occurred in the first 70 months
of operations in Iraq. A Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced (NOB) Mixed Design [98]
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is implemented to provide 1200 distinct combinations of points to construct, U . This
is the same process in described in Chapter IV. At each epoch the resources are ap-
plied and the amount available is decremented accordingly. If the resource reaches
an amount where the design level for a resource exceeds the amount remaining, that
specific combination of controls is not allowable.
5.3.3 System Dynamics.
To include Vt, we rewrite Equation 4.2 as
fi(x(t), u(t)) = ai1
(
Pt
bi1
− 1
)
+ ai2
(
Mt
bi2
− 1
)
+ ai3
(
Et
bi3
− 1
)
+ ai4
(
St
bi4
− 1
)
+ ai5
(
It
bi5
− 1
)
+ di1Dipt + di2Milt + di3Ecot + γiVt (5.1)
for each PMESI index, that is i = 1, ..., 5. The values (truncated) for the coefficients
described in Equation 5.1 are provided in Tables 9–11.
Table 9. a coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political 0.013479426 -0.02443707 0.000169151 -0.044326194 0.004092453
Military -0.0175788 0.03585036 -0.00000620 -0.0040145 -0.0062530
Economic -0.0188127 0.01368835 -0.0107756 -0.0482235 -0.0113442
Social 0.00261637 -0.008244 0.00509257 0.00208774 0.00426975
Infrastructure -0.0168042 0.01518943 -0.0001110 -0.004930 -0.0025961
5.3.4 Objective Functions.
The nature of the this problem makes it such that a cost is difficult to define and
there are no commonly accepted objective functions. In this research we consider the
three costs, c(xt, ut) described in Chapter IV to serve as objective functions. Since
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Table 10. b coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political 0.41742117 0.8970741 0.05780014 0.95238897 0.35346225
Military 0.31650255 0.78225326 0.00466155 0.03868765 0.29203887
Economic 0.26296986 0.20580581 0.2920259 0.21512186 0.30590902
Social 0.28936593 0.86394767 0.87821031 0.24140827 0.75522059
Infrastructure 0.56674121 0.54459506 0.00900396 0.17349528 0.17533378
Table 11. d and γ coefficients
i
k
Diplomatic Military Economic Violence
Political 0.00226496 -0.0445818 -0.0006344 -2.13E-06
Military -0.0033197 0.13759617 -0.0043553 4.04E-06
Economic -0.0096283 0.14074017 -0.0075998 1.12E-05
Social 0.00200315 -0.0027167 0.00028833 -2.12E-06
Infrastructure -0.0041684 0.03724438 -0.0012419 4.48E-06
the goal of this problem is improve the state, we accomplish this mathematically by
maximizing the area under the definite integral, or by minimizing the the distance
between xi(t) and 1 with or without assigning a penalty to values further away from 1.
All three objective functions are explored. In dynamic programming we consider both
the current cost, c(xt, ut) and the future costs as given by Bellman’s equation
J(xt, ut) = min
ut
ct(xt, ut) + J(xt+1). (5.2)
However, due to the nonlinear system dynamics, we approximate J(xt+1) using a
heuristic approach to obtain J˜(xt+1), an approximation.
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5.3.5 Base Heuristics.
A total of three base heuristics (Section 4.4.1) are explored, each providing an
efficient means to calculate J˜(xt+1). In order to increase the importance of improved
indices in later periods, weighting is introduced. Each objective function is weighted
by the value of t to place more value on future states. Each base heuristic is applied
to each objective function individually and then all three heuristics are utilized to
select u˜t(xt) for each objective function according to the following algorithm. The
results are listed in Table 12.
Algorithm Rollout Algorithm for the Constrained Nation–Building Problem
1. Start at t = 1.
2. Construct U˜ constructed of 1200 distinct combinations of points (NOB design)
and initial state vector, x0.
3. repeat
4. For all feasible u˜t ∈ U˜ calculate xt+1 = xt + x˙(xt, u˜t).
5. J˜t+2 =
∑T
k=t+2 c(xk, uk) where the base heuristic is calculated by applying
one or a combination of the three heuristics.
6. Evaluate c(xt+1, ut+1) + J˜t+2.
7. u˜t+1 = arg minu˜ c(xt+1, ut+1) + J˜t+2.
8. Calculate xt+1 by applying u˜t(xt).
9. Increment t by 1.
10. until t = T
The results from the model involving the violence factor show that run 4, 6, and
11 are the best for their respective objective functions and run 4 having the most
improvement overall. Looking at the resource allocation in Table 13, there were
11 runs which used greater than or equal to 90% fewer military resources and 7
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Table 12. Comparison of the Objective Functions and Base Heuristics to the Actual
Data Using Actual Violence Data
Run Objective Function Heuristic New Base % Difference
1 Reimann Average 214.62 161.26 33%
2 Reimann Decreasing 214.62 161.26 33%
3 Reimann Increasing 214.62 161.26 33%
4 Reimann All 237.83 161.26 47%
5 Squared Penalty Average 4.77E+07 7.35E+07 35%
6 Squared Penalty Decreasing 4.60E+07 7.35E+07 37%
7 Squared Penalty Increasing 5.32E+07 7.35E+07 28%
8 Squared Penalty All 5.31E+07 7.35E+07 28%
9 Penalty Average 162.10 186.12 13%
10 Penalty Decreasing 162.10 186.12 13%
11 Penalty Increasing 160.14 186.12 14%
12 Penalty All 166.14 186.12 11%
Table 13. Comparison of resource allocation (% less than actual)– The allocation for
all 12 runs compared to the actual allocation and the % less resources used with actual
violence data.
1 2 3 4
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
61.5 1.71 16.301 51 0 30.632 41 9.63 34.144 31 1.71 34.139
-12% -98% -52% -27% -100% -10% -41% -90% 0% -56% -98% 0%
5 6 7 8
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
32 3.42 34.139 32 3.42 34.139 32 3.42 34.139 31 1.71 34.139
-54% -97% 0% -54% -97% 0% -54% -97% 0% -56% -98% 0%
9 10 11 12
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
48.5 0 39.003 48.5 0 32.946 51 0 26.658 32 1.62 34.138
-29% -100% -15% -31% -100% -4% -27% -100% -16% -54% -98% 0%
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runs which used the same allocation of economic resources. The run with the most
improved objective function (run 4) observed both a significant decrease in military
resources and used all of the economic resources. Each of the heuristics and objective
functions provided improved results in every case. As an example the state and
control plot for run 4 is provided in Figure 10 and 11. Overall adding the violence
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Figure 10. States from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function– The solid line
represents the trajectory provided by the RO solution and the points represent the
actual index values for the given time period.
factor to the model decreased the best and worst percent difference for a run by 1%
but increased the average and decreasing heuristic runs by 8-15%. The addition of
this factor does not degrade or confound the model in any way.
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Figure 11. Controls from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function
5.4 Model with Predicted Violence
To account for the element of violence in this model we consider what PMESI
factors contribute to violence. To accomplish this we conduct a stepwise regression
using the PMESI index values as the predictor variables and the casualty data as the
response. A factorial to degree two design is selected to test all main and two-way
interaction effects. The resulting model
V˜t = 1729.284+1331.622∗Pt−2458.36∗Mt−6088.69 ((Pt − 0.58991) (Mt − 0.60008))
(5.3)
is determined using the minimum Bayesian Information Criterion by forward regress-
ing on the predictor variables. All variables are significant as shown by the p–values in
Table 14. Of particular note, the political and military variables are the only PMESI
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variables entering the model and resulted in an adjusted R2 of 0.892. The dataset has
Table 14. Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio p–value
Intercept 1729.284 162.9916 10.61 < 0.0001
Pt 1331.622 145.421 9.16 < 0.0001
Mt -2458.36 162.8202 -15.1 < 0.0001
(Pt − 0.58991) ∗ (Mt − 0.60008) -6088.69 767.3112 -7.94 < 0.0001
range of 2,380, mean of 1114.23, and a standard deviation of 701.88 indicating a high
level of variability in the data. Initial regression failed verification of the normality
of errors assumption at the tails of the data. To reduce the variance and influence of
outliers the violence data is transformed using the natural logarithm function; addi-
tionally the first month is excluded as it is not a complete month (March 30-31 2003).
The Chi–Squared and Shapiro–Wilk goodness of fit tests are conducted to determine
if the residuals are normally distributed. Both tests indicate normality with p-values
of 0.0956 and 0.1774 respectively with an α = 0.05. Based on the p–values in Table 14
and from the goodness of fit tests one can conclude that the predictor model for V is
appropriate.
As the rollout algorithms find improved objective function values the correspond-
ing state vector also changes. As V˜ is derived from the current state, the level of
violence will also change as the state changes. Incorporating V˜ into Equation 5.1
now will determine the level of violence as a function of the current state vector and
the calculated level of violence is used instead of the actual. The future states will
now include V˜ in determining the rate of change. Once again this is modeled in the
same manner as Chapter IV using the rollout algorithms and the objective function
values are compared to the values from the actual data. The results are listed in
Table 15.
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Table 15. Comparison of the Objective Functions and Base Heuristics to the Actual
Data with Calculated Violence Data
Run Objective Function Heuristic New Base % Difference
1 Reimann Average 209.89 161.26 30%
2 Reimann Decreasing 209.89 161.26 30%
3 Reimann Increasing 209.89 161.26 30%
4 Reimann All 239.21 161.26 48%
5 Squared Penalty Average 5.03E+07 7.35E+07 32%
6 Squared Penalty Decreasing 4.84E+07 7.35E+07 34%
7 Squared Penalty Increasing 5.57E+07 7.35E+07 24%
8 Squared Penalty All 5.55E+07 7.35E+07 24%
9 Penalty Average 164.55 186.12 12%
10 Penalty Decreasing 165.55 186.12 12%
11 Penalty Increasing 163.39 186.12 12%
12 Penalty All 168.90 186.12 9%
Just as in previous runs, the improvement of runs 4 and 6 improved the most for
their respective objective function, while run 10 is the best for the Penalty objective
function, and run 4 is the most improved overall. Looking at the resource allocation
in Table 13 there were 11 runs which used greater than or equal to 97% fewer military
resources and 7 runs which used the same allocation of economic resources. The run
with the most improved objective function (run 4) observed both significant decrease
in military resources and the use of all economic resources. All presented a significant
and consistent improvement. Each of the heuristics and objective functions provided
improved results in every case. As an example the state and control plot for run 4
is provided in Figure 12 and 13. Overall adding the violence factor to the model
decreased worst run percent difference by 3% and the best run percent remained at
48%. The remainder remained at the same percent difference or increased up to 12%.
The addition of this factor does not degrade or confound the model in any way.
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Table 16. Comparison of resource allocation (% less than actual)– The allocation for all
12 runs compared to the actual allocation and the % less resources used with calculated
data.
1 2 3 4
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
61.5 1.71 16.645 51.5 0 30.543 34 16.38 34.142 32 1.17 34.141
-12% -98% -51% -26% -100% -11% -51% -83% 0% -54% -99% 0%
5 6 7 8
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
33 2.88 34.141 33 2.88 34.141 33 2.88 34.141 32 1.17 34.141
-53% -97% 0% -53% -97% 0% -53% -97% 0% -54% -99% 0%
9 10 11 12
Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco Dip Mil Eco
48 0 30.123 33.5 0 32.693 51.5 0 29.863 31 1.71 34.141
-31% -100% -12% -52% -100% -4% -26% -100% -13% -56% -98% 0%
5.4.1 Violence as a augmented state variable.
Violence is considered a random variable so that the actual data is a probabilistic
outcome. In this section, the calculated violence is used in place of the actual data.
In Figure 14 we can first observe that the predicted violence level, V˜ based on the
actual states is an adequate fit to the actual violence data. Additionally two very
distinct trajectories of violence are observed, one which deaths increases drastically
and one which deaths decrease to lower levels. In runs 3, 11, and 12 the number of
casualties rapidly increase from 500 to 4500 at months 50-60 corresponding to the
military state dropping and the depletion of economic resources. In runs 1, 2, 4-6, 9,
and 10 the level of violence remains generally constant with a slight decline, where
as in runs 7 and 8 we see a decline to a level very close or at 0. In both run 7 and 8
the military state remained at a high level (near 1) and the economic resources were
allocated throughout the entire time period.
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Figure 12. States from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function– The solid line
represents the trajectory provided by the RO solution and the points represent the
actual index values for the given time period.
5.4.2 Violence as a Function of PMESI.
The implementation of Equation 5.3 demonstrates two import aspects. First, V˜t
is described as a function of PMESI, specifically the political and military variables.
This allows the model to continually update the number of civilian deaths based
upon the state vector providing instantaneous feedback to the model at each epoch.
Secondly, this allows for limited predictive capabilities based upon the state of country
whereas most models deal with military casualties where military capability, tactics,
and protection play an integral role in determining the number of deaths. As a area
for future work a single objective function to minimize deaths may be implemented.
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Figure 13. Controls from run 4 with the Reimann sum objective function
5.5 Conclusions
The addition of feedback to the model via violence highlights a few key points.
First, augmenting the state with the violence factor overall improves the dynamic
programming model and approach. This allows the rollout algorithms in general to
find solutions which improve the objective function. While the maximum and mini-
mum improvement in Table 12 did decrease by 1% the majority of the improvement
was 8-13% higher than in Table 7. Similar results are found when implementing the
calculated violence. The inclusion of the calculated violence versus the actual violence
provides a means to base the violence on the PMESI state of the country. Secondly, it
demonstrates the use of determining violence through civilian casualties and the state
of the country rather than levels and capabilities of armed forces. This is important
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in nation–building operations and other non–kinetic operations where the primary
mission of the armed force is not offensive in nature.
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VI. Contributions and Conclusion
Throughout this research several conclusions and contributions were demonstrated.
This chapter presents the major findings.
6.1 Methodology and Model
A modeling methodology is developed which creates indices to capture the “state”
of a nation. This method is novel and innovative in that it makes use of open source
data and is adaptable to the set of available data and is accomplished using the DIME–
PMESII paradigm. The data aspect of this model makes use of various open source
data, which is available for several nations. The DIME-PMESII paradigm provides a
framework to describe the states and controls of this complex system. This framework
is easily adaptable to any nation and will make use of the available data. The ability
of the model is illustrated through the nation–building effort in Iraq. Additionally,
support and interest in the model has been expressed by several commands (Central
Command, US Army Africa, and Pacific Command) for wargaming and planning
purposes. Generation of this model provides a foundation on which to expand and
the dynamics required to generate resource allocation policies.
6.2 Use of Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming provides a framework in which to use the developed model
to solve this political and social science problem and elicit control policies which
improve the state of the system. Several different objectives and heuristics were
tested using rollout algorithms with improvement over the actual policy in every case.
While this is the initial work to frame the problem using a dynamic programming
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framework, additional work may be done with the objective functions, heuristics, and
constraints to enhance the model.
6.3 Inclusion of Violence
One of the most unfortunate aspects of all phases of war is the death of civilians;
this aspect is modeled in two ways. First, through inclusion within the model of actual
data collected to measure these incidents and then through an expected measure of
violence. Implementing the violence factor provides feedback to the model in the form
of enemy or insurgent force’s actions. The expected measure is novel in that it makes
use of the PMESI state of the country to determine the level of violence. The future
state is determined through the rate of change based on the current state, controls,
and violence. Additional work may be done to implement the number of deaths as
an objective or part of a multi–objective approach.
6.4 Conclusion
Overall a novel, traceable, and defendable approach to the nation–building prob-
lem is developed and implemented to address a gap in both modeling and resource
allocation to political and social science problems using dynamic programming. The
testing of multiple objectives and use of heuristics through rollout algorithms show
policies exist which improve the state according to the objective function value. The
implementation of enemy action in the model enhances the model and more accurately
defines the system according to the real world problem it is modeling. Improvement
is shown by generating policies to increase an objective function based on a nation’s
PMESI state variables. This modeling approach and implementation of dynamic pro-
gramming provides a significant ability to wargamers and modelers concerned with
the nation–building problem.
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6.5 Future Work
This initial modeling effort, use of a dynamic programming framework, and de-
velopment of rollout algorithms for resource allocation offer a rich foundation to for
future research to include:
• PMESI index generation strategies as new data are available.
• Additional methods to determine the coefficients in the system of differential
equations.
• Stability analysis of the system of differential equations.
• Poisson distributed casualties as a function of the PMESI state.
• Augmenting the state with other enemy actions and SME input.
• Additional objective functions which may include violence or other enemy ac-
tions.
• Heuristics to better approximate cost–to–go function.
• Explore other conjectured functional forms for the system of differential equa-
tions.
• More refined numerical differential equation solution methods.
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Appendix A. Weights and PMESI-DME values
Table 17. Weights and PMESI values
Weights P M E S I
10 0.240586 0.879987 0.132659 0.542361 0.01059
10 0.240653 0.889444 0.132659 0.535181 0.009889
10 0.240718 0.868313 0.132659 0.528231 0.06475
10 0.240781 0.840435 0.139791 0.521506 0.137319
10 0.240844 0.845627 0.145498 0.515003 0.07991
10 0.240905 0.803333 0.148351 0.508717 0.09553
10 0.240966 0.853037 0.158693 0.502644 0.111153
10 0.241025 0.788425 0.164399 0.496779 0.126978
10 0.294386 0.759259 0.175811 0.49112 0.143145
10 0.297033 0.753802 0.177595 0.485662 0.159568
1 0.274542 0.792581 0.216499 0.480401 0.176159
1 0.317623 0.763066 0.214697 0.475332 0.196826
1 0.325756 0.741637 0.236789 0.470867 0.240652
1 0.316681 0.623019 0.236771 0.467062 0.229184
1 0.325994 0.671914 0.235682 0.463851 0.176061
1 0.333737 0.660867 0.236733 0.490333 0.162521
1 0.292175 0.672715 0.244917 0.488105 0.165584
1 0.289083 0.592473 0.243115 0.486268 0.044565
1 0.294907 0.5772 0.265208 0.484754 0.213742
1 0.304837 0.626966 0.277671 0.483497 0.216987
1 0.306734 0.449628 0.255184 0.48243 0.222815
1 0.310245 0.678609 0.265865 0.481487 0.043264
1 0.301896 0.550076 0.270487 0.482044 0.173015
1 0.481669 0.646522 0.267977 0.481107 0.169039
1 0.489428 0.66091 0.293998 0.480093 0.221532
1 0.495546 0.621693 0.291131 0.478935 0.185926
1 0.502322 0.423912 0.284698 0.5069 0.18195
1 0.502403 0.426045 0.303943 0.505254 0.2011
1 0.506309 0.473811 0.322474 0.503264 0.250048
1 0.513206 0.365226 0.33102 0.500863 0.2486
1 0.520224 0.415487 0.337782 0.497987 0.275364
1 0.534915 0.460654 0.310664 0.494569 0.290815
1 0.547781 0.507261 0.305301 0.490545 0.280312
1 0.555534 0.612021 0.305644 0.485876 0.265316
1 0.537418 0.522916 0.228721 0.480629 0.238117
1 0.707723 0.487344 0.244274 0.474901 0.249329
1 0.722704 0.4576 0.251279 0.468783 0.294008
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 17 – Continued
Weights P M E S I
1 0.724949 0.436149 0.28222 0.462372 0.27029
1 0.734419 0.349506 0.281843 0.513929 0.260553
1 0.733153 0.360201 0.288689 0.507213 0.29037
1 0.736864 0.308068 0.304922 0.500486 0.283341
1 0.759876 0.338772 0.308448 0.500509 0.275967
1 0.767478 0.31686 0.285379 0.494041 0.275778
1 0.770784 0.242006 0.277458 0.48784 0.296197
1 0.779 0.286448 0.270078 0.491999 0.280122
1 0.778518 0.293023 0.300522 0.486608 0.274002
1 0.779445 0.424931 0.38192 0.493427 0.259616
1 0.779117 0.361439 0.391993 0.489215 0.278725
1 0.767905 0.376936 0.417044 0.478021 0.301756
1 0.769977 0.212308 0.41927 0.475483 0.312836
1 0.781398 0.340717 0.432195 0.473563 0.299445
1 0.784269 0.413797 0.428002 0.472246 0.321493
1 0.788793 0.367303 0.448774 0.471515 0.337761
1 0.812236 0.620004 0.454566 0.509688 0.355672
1 0.811699 0.660914 0.467492 0.511723 0.392405
1 0.811161 0.659484 0.492899 0.514252 0.416556
1 0.849936 0.748501 0.460532 0.533882 0.412167
1 0.850014 0.768705 0.491289 0.537216 0.407258
1 0.899504 0.762446 0.888588 0.540861 0.36836
1 0.899507 0.745153 0.880733 0.544754 0.37034
10 0.89951 0.666884 0.918171 0.550241 0.367233
10 0.899513 0.718053 0.913883 0.555852 0.361684
10 0.899516 0.802456 0.947041 0.561528 0.355089
10 0.899519 0.798139 0.960942 0.563872 0.399391
10 0.899522 0.796374 0.96343 0.56949 0.403605
10 0.899526 0.786499 0.916702 0.574987 0.396189
10 0.899529 0.778416 0.882457 0.580301 0.368093
10 0.899532 0.865277 0.849995 0.585371 0.436651
10 0.899535 0.834748 0.819316 0.590135 0.411707
10 0.899538 0.801217 0.793273 0.602032 0.338448
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Table 18. DME values
Dip Mil Eco
0.0000 0 0.428571
1.0000 1.5 0.428571
1.0000 1.5 0.428571
1.0000 1.49 0.428571
1.0000 1.39 0.428571
1.0000 1.32 0.428571
1.0000 1.31 0.428571
1.0000 1.23 1.625
1.0000 1.22 1.625
1.0000 1.22 1.625
1.0000 1.15 1.625
1.0000 1.3 1.625
1.0000 1.37 1.625
1.0000 1.38 1.625
1.0000 1.38 1.625
0.5000 1.4 1.625
0.5000 1.4 1.625
0.5000 1.38 1.625
0.5000 1.38 1.625
0.5000 1.38 0.166667
0.5000 1.48 0.166667
0.5000 1.5 0.166667
0.5000 1.55 0.166667
0.5000 1.5 0.166667
0.5000 1.42 0.166667
0.5000 1.38 0.166667
0.5000 1.35 0.166667
0.5000 1.38 0.166667
0.5000 1.38 0.166667
0.5000 1.38 0.166667
0.5000 1.52 0.166667
0.5000 1.6 0.266667
0.5000 1.6 0.266667
0.5000 1.36 0.266667
0.5000 1.33 0.266667
0.5000 1.33 0.266667
0.5000 1.32 0.266667
0.5000 1.32 0.266667
0.5000 1.269 0.266667
0.5000 1.3 0.266667
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 18 – Continued
Dip Mil Eco
0.5000 1.38 0.266667
0.5000 1.44 0.266667
0.5000 1.44 0.266667
0.5000 1.4 0.266667
0.5000 1.4 0.266667
0.5000 1.32 0.266667
0.5000 1.35 0.266667
0.5000 1.42 0.266667
0.5000 1.46 0.266667
0.5000 1.497 0.266667
0.5000 1.57 0.266667
0.5000 1.6 0.266667
0.5000 1.62 0.266667
0.5000 1.68 0.266667
0.5000 1.71 0.266667
0.5000 1.62 0.225
0.5000 1.6 0.225
0.5000 1.57 0.225
0.5000 1.57 0.225
0.5000 1.55 0.225
0.5000 1.53 0.225
0.5000 1.5 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.225
0.5000 1.48 0.183333
0.5000 1.45 0.183333
0.5000 1.42 0.183333
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Appendix B. Civilian Deaths by Month
Table 19. Civilian Deaths by Month
Month Deaths Month Deaths Month Deaths
1 36 31 1190 61 1334
2 931 32 1052 62 1025
3 382 33 1090 63 608
4 523 34 917 64 600
5 542 35 1280 65 525
6 678 36 1286 66 474
7 448 37 1561 67 505
8 390 38 1462 68 392
9 361 39 1927 69 420
10 453 40 2177 70 391
11 484 41 2866
12 544 42 2519
13 874 43 2111
14 523 44 2609
15 447 45 2387
16 720 46 2225
17 625 47 2173
18 519 48 2101
19 590 49 2274
20 698 50 1981
21 673 51 2392
22 808 52 1811
23 901 53 2239
24 1151 54 1850
25 619 55 992
26 874 56 852
27 1045 57 790
28 1031 58 795
29 1337 59 711
30 1988 60 907
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Appendix C. State and Control Plots for Chapter IV
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Figure 15. Run 1 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 16. Run 1 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 17. Run 2 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 18. Run 2 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 19. Run 3 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 20. Run 3 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 21. Run 4 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 22. Run 4 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 23. Run 5 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 24. Run 5 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 25. Run 6 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 26. Run 6 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 27. Run 7 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 28. Run 7 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 29. Run 8 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 30. Run 8 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 31. Run 9 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 32. Run 9 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 33. Run 10 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 34. Run 10 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 35. Run 11 States for Chapter IV
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Figure 36. Run 11 Controls for Chapter IV
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Figure 37. Run 12 States for Chapter IV
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
(a) Diplomatic
Time (months)
Co
nt
ro
l
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
(b) Military
Time (months)
Co
nt
ro
l
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
(c) Economic
Time (months)
Co
nt
ro
l
Figure 38. Run 12 Controls for Chapter IV
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Appendix D. State and Control Plots for Chapter V with
Actual Violence
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(a) Political
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Military
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) Economic
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(d) Social
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(e) Infrastructure
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
Figure 39. Run 1 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 40. Run 1 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 41. Run 2 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 42. Run 2 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 43. Run 3 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 44. Run 3 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 45. Run 4 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 46. Run 4 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 47. Run 5 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 48. Run 5 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 49. Run 6 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 50. Run 6 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 51. Run 7 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 52. Run 7 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 53. Run 8 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 54. Run 8 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 55. Run 9 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 56. Run 9 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 57. Run 10 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 58. Run 10 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 59. Run 11 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 60. Run 11 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 61. Run 12 States for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Figure 62. Run 12 Controls for Chapter V with Actual Violence
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Appendix E. State and Control Plots for Chapter V with
Calculated Violence
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Figure 63. Run 1 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 64. Run 1 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 65. Run 2 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 66. Run 2 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 67. Run 3 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 68. Run 3 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 69. Run 4 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 70. Run 4 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
128
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(a) Political
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Military
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) Economic
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(d) Social
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
20 40 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(e) Infrastructure
Time (months)
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
Figure 71. Run 5 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 72. Run 5 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 73. Run 6 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 74. Run 6 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 75. Run 7 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 76. Run 7 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 77. Run 8 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 78. Run 8 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 79. Run 9 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 80. Run 9 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 81. Run 10 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 82. Run 10 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 83. Run 11 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 84. Run 11 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 85. Run 12 States for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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Figure 86. Run 12 Controls for Chapter V with Calculated Violence
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